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“...usually, that's the way it goes, but don’t forget, 
       every once in a while, it goes the other way too...”   Abstract 
 
The thesis consists of an introductory part and three self-contained 
papers. 
 
Paper [I] studies the determinants of the differences in expenditure 
on services for functionally impaired individuals among municipalities in 
Sweden. A spatial autoregressive model is used in order to test whether 
the decisions on the expenditure level in a neighboring municipality affect 
the municipality’s own expenditure. The results show of spatial interaction 
among neighbors, possible due to mimicking. However, when controlling 
for differences among counties there is no evidence of spatial interaction. 
Therefore, the positive interaction first found can be interpreted either as 
a result of differences in the way county councils diagnose individuals or 
due to interaction among the neighbors in the same county.  
Paper [II] takes advantage of a new intergovernmental grant in two 
ways. First, the grant is used to study the effect on municipal spending 
related to the grant. Second, the grant is used to test a hypothesis of 
spatial interaction among municipalities due to mimicking behavior. The 
data used pertains to the periods before and after the introduction of the 
grant. A fixed-effects spatial lag model is used to study the spatial 
interactions among municipalities. The results show that before the grant, 
municipalities interact with their neighbors when setting the expenditure 
level, while there is no evidence of interaction in the second period. This 
would support the hypothesis that the grants provide information to the 
municipalities and the need for mimicking diminishes with the grant. 
Paper [III] examines whether local public expenditures on services 
to functionally impaired individuals crowd out other local public 
expenditures in Sweden. The hypothesis is tested on five different 
spending areas using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) fixed-effects model. 
While the results give no support for crowding out in the areas of social 
assistance, culture & leisure, and childcare & preschool, a negative 
relationship on spending for elderly & disabled care and on spending for 
education is found, suggesting that crowding out indeed occurs within the 
municipal sector. The negative relationships are significant both in a 
statistical and an economic sense.  
Keywords: Local public expenditures, Spatial econometrics, 
Intergovernmental grants, Spatial interaction, Intergovernmental grants, 
Expenditure crowding out, Functionally impaired. Acknowledgements 
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1. Introduction 
Reforms and decentralization of the public sector (often) originate at the 
national government level, while being administered and carried out at the 
local level - which is meant to improve the public services provision and 
increase the accountability of the local government. One of the main 
arguments for decentralizing public activities is that the local governments 
are better informed about individual demands for public services than the 
national government (Oates, 1972). During the 1990’s, Sweden 
implemented major national reforms affecting the local government, thus 
expanding the local government areas of responsibility. For example, the 
authority of school provision was decentralized in 1991, when the 
responsibility for compulsory and upper secondary school provision was 
transferred from the national level to the municipalities. In 1992, the 
Ädel-reform was implemented, which transferred the responsibility for 
long-term service and care of the elderly and disabled from county 
councils to municipalities. Moreover, in 1994, the Handicap Reform 
transferred the responsibility for providing services and care to the 
functionally impaired from the county councils to the municipalities. 
When local governments are faced with new areas of responsibilities 
imposed by the national government, it is important to analyze how these 
changes affect the service and expenditures of the local government, as 
well as the allocation of resources, including the interaction among 
municipalities.  
 
What consequences (or perhaps even problems) are local governments 
facing when they get additional services and responsibilities? For one, 
resources to finance the new services and areas are needed. Resources to 2                                 Introduction and Summary 
finance the new areas could come from, for example, intergovernmental 
grants, an increased tax rate, or redistribution from other areas of the local 
government. When the budget is limited, the local government may be 
forced to prioritize its public service provision in another way than 
previously in order to finance the new responsibilities. This could then 
affect other areas of the local government, leading to crowding out of 
such areas within the local government sector. Another consequence that 
naturally comes with new areas of responsibility is the lack of experience 
and the information uncertainty that may follow. There are costs 
associated with learning and obtaining information; in order to minimize 
these costs, the local government may interact (mimic for example) with 
policy makers from other local governments in order to learn from them 
and avoid the cost of obtaining information themselves. This could lead 
to local governments’ expenditure decisions being positively affected by 
the level of spending by their neighbors.1 A third consequence concerns 
the regional differences in the provision of a public service. Even if the 
national government policies are intended to be uniform and equally 
accessible for everyone regardless of location, the provision of the public 
service is also likely to differ due to the differences that exist among local 
governments. For example, it can differ due to political ideologies but also 
due to differences in tax base or population size.  
 
This thesis, which consists of three self-contained papers, studies different 
aspects of the municipalities’ expenditure decisions regarding the 
provision of services to functionally impaired (which was transferred to 
the municipalities as part of the handicap reform of 1994). Paper [I] 
1 Neighbors are not necessarily geographical neighbors; other forms of 
“neighborhoods” are also possible.  Introduction and Summary                                                              3 
addresses regional differences in expenditure for services to functional 
impaired. Paper [II] analyzes an unconditional non-matching 
intergovernmental grant and explores whether this grant has affected 
spending and the level of interaction among municipalities. Paper [III] 
examines the effect of the expenditure for services to functionally 
impaired on other areas within the local government, with regards to the 
hypothesis of expenditure crowding out.  
 
The rest of this introduction is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly 
describes the local governments in Sweden, and the background to the 
reform for functionally impaired. Section 3 gives a short review of the 
theory and empirical studies of the provision and determinants of local 
public services relevant to this thesis. Summaries of the papers included in 
this thesis are given in Section 4.  
 
2. Background 
The local government  
Sweden is divided into 290 municipalities and 21 counties. The 
municipalities and county councils are responsible for different activities, 
and they are entitled to levy their own taxes. The municipalities provide 
services and functions such as elderly care, education and childcare, while 
county councils are responsible for areas such as health and medical care. 
Many of the services provided by the local governments are regulated in 
various laws or have stipulated guidelines (i.e. the Social Services Act, the 
Education Act, and the Health and Medical Services Act). In many 
countries, the municipalities’ areas of responsibility have been extended 4                                 Introduction and Summary 
and the municipal public service provisions have expanded over time. 
Sweden has implemented numerous reforms and decentralizations of 
public services to the local government level over the last decades, thus 
expanding the local government sector.2  
 





In Figure 1, the government consumption expenditures for the three 
levels of governments are shown (i.e. central government, county council 
and municipality level). As can be seen in the figure, the municipalities’ 
2 The Ädel-reform, the Education Reform, the Handicap Reform and the 










Municipalites Central Government County Councils
Note: The figure shows the government consumption expenditures for the 
different levels of government, given in million SEK, current prices, for the 
years 1993-2006. Transfers are not included in these figures. Source: Statistics 
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share of total public expenditure has increased over the years, from about 
44 percent in 1993 to nearly 50 percent in 2006.  
 
Table 1 shows the average distribution of municipal income and 
expenditures for the year 2006. Tax revenue is the main source of revenue 
for the municipalities. Municipalities are entitled to set the local tax rate to 
finance their provision of public services; however, since income taxes are 
already high in Sweden, the excess burden of a further increase in the tax 
rate could be very large for the municipalities. 3 Thus, this makes it harder 
for municipalities to motivate additional tax increases. This, in turn, also 
makes them dependent on other sources of revenue, in order to fully 
finance the public service provision. Other sources of revenue include 
intergovernmental grants and user fees, which amount to sixteen and 
seven percent, respectively, in 2006.  
Table 1. Distribution of municipal income and expenditures, year 2006. 
Expenditures     Revenue     
Elderly & disabled  32%    Tax revenue  68% 
Education  31%    Grants  16% 
Childcare   14%    User fees    7% 
Infrastructure  8%    Rent & sales  4% 
Social Assistance  7%    Other revenue  5% 
Culture & Leisure   5%       
Other  3%          




The distribution of income and expenditures differs among municipalities. 
Due to the differences, there is a fiscal equalization grant system in place, 
intended to guarantee that all municipalities have an equivalent economic 
3 Property taxes are set and collected at the national level. 6                                 Introduction and Summary 
foundation irrespective of their particular structural circumstance. The 
fiscal equalization grant system includes income equalization, cost 
equalization, and structural grants.  
Reform for Services to Functionally Impaired 
 
The handicap policy of today began in the 1960’s and 1970’s with an 
effort at creating equal opportunities for individuals with disabilities, 
where concepts such as “integrating and normalizing” played a central 
role. Up until then, the public provision of care and services had mostly 
been of medical character, and had often been provided in institutional 
facilities by the county councils. A number of reforms were implemented 
in order to create conditions that would enable those with a handicap to 
live their lives in the same way as other members of society (SOU4 
2008:77).5 In 1994, there was another Handicap Reform which, among 
other things, clarified the division of responsibilities between county 
councils and municipalities for disabled and functionally impaired 
individuals. For instance, the responsibility for providing services to 
functionally impaired individuals was transferred to the municipalities. In 
addition to the transfer, a new law called the LSS-act6 was implemented. 
The LSS-act is an entitlement law geared towards individuals with 
functional impairments; this act extended the rights of the functionally 
impaired and more people became eligible to receive services.  
 
The transfer of the responsibility for services to functionally impaired was 
a continuance of the decentralization trend in Sweden: the trend was to 
4 SOU = Swedish Government Official Report. 
5 For example, the “Provisions and Services Law” (Omsorgslag) from 1967. 
6 LSS-act = Act Concerning Support and Service for Persons with Certain 
Functional Impairments, LSS (1993:387). Introduction and Summary                                                              7 
transfer public services provision from the central level to the local level 
with reforms such as the Education Reform and the Ädel-reform 
mentioned in the introduction. One reason for transferring the 
responsibility for services to functionally impaired was that the new LSS-
act was designed to be a compliment to other laws, laws for which the 
municipalities already had responsibility. To ensure that the individuals 
eligible for the LSS services would not be caught between different levels 
of government (the county level and municipal level), the LSS service 
needed to be on the same level as the other laws relevant for the 
functionally impaired. The main reason for implementing a new law such 
as the LSS-act was that individuals with severe functionally impairments 
were facing worse living condition than most other people in the 
community. The laws and regulations that were in existence prior to the 
LSS-act were not sufficient to create the good living conditions that other 
people without functional impairment already had. With the LSS-act, 
individuals with severe and long-lasting functional impairment became 
part of their community, which enabled them to get greater control of 
their own life (SOU 2008:77).   
 
The LSS-act 
The LSS-act, section 1, contains provisions relating to measures for 
special support and services to those with an intellectual disability, autism 
or a condition resembling autism; or for those with a significant and 
permanent intellectual impairment that occurred after brain damage in 
adulthood; or for those with other major and permanent physical or 
mental impairments not due to normal aging. Individuals who belong to 
any of the above three groups are entitled to support and services if they 8                                 Introduction and Summary 
need such assistance in their daily lives and if their needs are not satisfied 
in some other way. The support and services that eligible individuals can 
receive, according to the LSS-act, include services such as “counseling and 
other personal support”7, “personal assistance”8, “relief service in the 
home”, “residential arrangement for adults” and “daily activities”.  
 
The LSS-act recognizes that the individuals are different, with different 
needs and wishes. The LSS-act gives the entitlement and right for 
individuals to obtain services according to the act, while there is room for 
individual variation. The possibility of individual variation in the act exists 
to ensure that each individual gets services according to what suits her and 
her needs the best (NBHW9, 2006). Furthermore, available municipal 
resources (or lack thereof) is not a valid reason for influencing the 
decision-making, as under the Social Services Act, which is a more 
general, goal oriented framework law, leaving room for the municipalities 
to interpret and implement the goals in accordance with local ambitions 
(Lewin, Westin, and Lewin, 2008). Another purpose of the LSS-act was to 
give individuals with functional impairment a stronger position in the 
welfare system. An explicit purpose of the LSS-act was to overcome local 
variation in support (Lewin et al., 2008). 
 
7 Counseling and other personal support is the one service for which the county 
council is still responsible (although, by agreements, some municipalities have 
taken over this service as well). 
8 Personal Assistance is the responsibility of the municipalities for the first twenty 
hours (per week). If an individual’s needs call for more than twenty hours per 
week, then it is the responsibility of the federal government (Social Service 
Administration) (as regulated in the LASS, Assistance Benefit Act). 
9 NBHW = The National Board of Health and Welfare. Introduction and Summary                                                              9 
Since the transfer of responsibility and the implementation of the LSS-act, 
there has been a considerable increase in the expenditure for services to 
functionally impaired. In 1998, the per capita expenditure was 2095 SEK, 
while ten years later, in 2008, it had increased to 4895 SEK per capita.10 
The increase in the municipalities’ expenditure for providing the service to 
functionally impaired can largely be attributed to changes in the LSS-act 
over the years; more people are included in the act now as compared to 
when it was first implemented. In 1999, 43991 individuals were granted 
services; in 2008, this number had increased to 58735 individuals 
(NBHW). Thus, the number of individuals who received services 
according to the LSS-act increased with more than 30 percent during 
1999-2008. However, there are major regional differences within the 
country with regards to the number of individuals granted services; from 
28 individuals per 10000 inhabitants in the municipality of Vaxholm to 
169 individuals per 10000 inhabitants in the municipality of Vännäs 
(NBHW). There are also great variations in expenditure per capita in the 
municipalities, which largely contribute to the differences in the number 
of individuals who are granted services. In Figure 2, the distribution of 
LSS expenditure per capita (age 0-64) for all municipalities for the year 
2008 is illustrated. In 2008, the average expenditure for LSS-services 
ranges from 655 SEK per capita for the municipality of Ydre, to 11646 
SEK in the municipality of Vännäs. The average spending for the country 
was 4594 SEK per capita at this point in time.   
 
 
10 Current prices, source: www.WebOr.se (WebOr is an online database with data 
from Statistics Sweden provided by the Swedish Association of Local Authorities 
and Regions). 10                                 Introduction and Summary 
  Figure 2. Distribution of LSS expenditure per capita (age 0-64) for  






In 2004, a new expenditure equalization system with regards to LSS-
expenditure was implemented (SFS 2003:886). The expenditure 
equalization for LSS is not part of the regular intergovernmental grant 
system. The purpose of the LSS expenditure equalization system is to 
create the same basic economic conditions for the municipalities to 





















































Note: The LSS expenditure for all municipalities is included in the figure; 
however, due to lack of space, only the name of every twentieth municipality is 
written on the axis. The municipalities are sorted in the order of minimum to 
maximum LSS expenditure per capita (age 0-64). Source: WebOr. Introduction and Summary                                                              11 
3. Provision and Determinants of Local Public Services  
The purpose of this section is to describe the parts of the research 
tradition in local public economics that intersect with this thesis. There are 
mainly two strands of the literature that are of particular interest for the 
present thesis. One is the literature on the determinants of public 
expenditures. This literature tries to answer questions such as what factors 
are important in explaining the variation in expenditures among local 
governments, and how do local governments (or their decision-makers) 
react to economic incentives. The other part concerns the (economic) 
relations between the municipalities and between the municipalities and 
the other levels of government in a nation, commonly known as fiscal 
federalism. Questions typical for the field of fiscal federalism are how 
should the responsibilities between the different levels of the public sector 
be assigned in a nation? What are the effects of decentralization of 
decision-making from the central to the local level? Do local governments 
interact with one another in their decision-making and, if so, how?  
Since the seminal work by Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom 
and Goodman (1973), the determinants of public expenditure at 
decentralized levels of government are often analyzed with the median 
voter model. The local decision is then regarded as a function of the 
characteristics of the median voter. In empirical applications, determinants 
also include economic, demographic and geographical characteristics of 
the local government, for example tax base, population, 
intergovernmental grants, as well as other institutional and socio-
economic factors. It is important to include intergovernmental grants in 
local governmental expenditure studies. Due to vertical fiscal imbalances 12                                 Introduction and Summary 
many local governments are dependent on the grants in order to fulfill 
their responsibilities. A vertical fiscal imbalance arises when expenditure 
responsibilities are decentralized to a lower level, but not the equivalent 
increase in revenue raising responsibilities (Boadway, 2001). How do 
municipalities react to grants from the central government? For one thing, 
empirical work often finds that public spending from grants exceeds that 
from equivalent increases in income, which is contrary to the theory of 
intergovernmental grants.11,12 This empirical finding was labeled “the 
flypaper effect” by Courant, Gramlich, and Rubinfeld (1979); since 
“money sticks where it hits”. However, empirical estimation may face 
problems of, for example, endogeneity or omitted variables. Dahlberg, 
Mörk,  Rattsø and Ågen (2008a) account for endogeneity of grants by 
using a discontinuity in the grant provision in Sweden to identify the 
effect of the grant. They find that the grant is used to increase spending 
(by more than with a similar increase in the tax base), while the grant is 
not used to reduce tax rates. Witterblad (2008) studies the determinants of 
local expenditures and the existence of a flypaper effect by using a 
political model that includes income distribution (low and high income 
earners) in the municipalities. His results show that the income 
distribution in the municipality explains the flypaper effect and the 
differences in expenditure among regions; municipalities with a higher 
share of low income earners show a greater flypaper effect.  
Empirical evidence also shows that political party variables are of great 
importance in the decisions making. In a study on Spanish regions, Solé-
11 Theory predicts that an increase in grants should have the same effect as an 
equivalent increase in income (Bradford and Oates, 1971 a,b). 
12 There is a large literature considering intergovernmental grants; see e.g. Hines 
and Thaler (1995) and Oates (1999). Introduction and Summary                                                              13 
Ollé (2006) found that left-wing governments increase taxes, debts and 
spending when their electoral margin increases; while right-wing 
governments, on the other hand, decrease taxes, debts and spending when 
their electoral margin increases. The incentives of the local policy or 
decisions-makers may be to support his or their own goals or ideologies. 
Dahlberg, Lindquist, and Mörk (2008b) use the same discontinuity rule in 
the grants in Sweden as Dahlberg et al. (2008a), but it is now used to study 
the incentives of bureaucrats, and how they reacts to grants. They find 
that the number of bureaucrats increases when there is an increase in 
grants, while the number of other personnel in the local government is 
unaffected by the grant. This adds to the explanation of variation in 
expenditure due to the fact that the local bureaucrats may let their own 
goals influence the spending decisions regarding grants.  
Public services are usually provided by different levels of government, in 
Sweden as well as in other countries. Via new laws, reforms, 
decentralizations and other factors, such as an increasing elderly 
population, the responsibility and the extent of the public provision of a 
service can change, both by size and by what level that is obligated to 
provide the service (transfer from the county to the municipality level, for 
example). Although there are benefits from providing certain types of 
services at the central level, such as defense, many other services and 
functions are best provided at the local government level. One reason for 
the decentralization of public services to the local government level is of 
normative character; it may be desirable that public services that help and 
enable citizens in their daily life should be provided at the same level as 
other daily public services, such as elderly care, education and daycare, in 
order to integrate all individuals into their own community. This is one of 14                                 Introduction and Summary 
the reasons why services to functionally impaired was transferred to the 
municipalities, to make them part of their own municipality as well as to 
normalize functional impairments in society. Another argument for 
decentralization is that communities differ from one another, and services 
to citizens should be provided at the local level, because the local level is 
in a better position to account for their preferences and other local 
characteristics, as compared to the central government. The local variation 
in provision would thus improve efficiency, rather than the uniform 
provision that the central government is assumed to provide (Boadway, 
2001). This is the classical argument for decentralization (Oates, 1972).  
With decentralization, local variations in tax rate, service level, as well as 
the performance of the local policy-makers and politicians are more 
visible to the inhabitants of the jurisdictions. With free mobility, 
inhabitants can move to (or stay in) the region that best suits their needs 
and preferences. Since municipalities collect taxes from the inhabitants’ 
income, the decision to move to another jurisdiction will directly affect 
the resources of the local government.13 For this reason, local 
governments are interdependent when making their tax policy or 
expenditure level decisions; they must also take other jurisdictions’ 
decisions into account; giving rise to fiscal interaction. One aspect of fiscal 
interaction is the theory of tax competition. Tax competition is when the 
local governments compete for a mobile tax base (see Wilson, 1999, for 
an overview); where the tax rate in one region depends on the tax rate in 
neighboring regions. Positive spatial autocorrelation is found when a 
jurisdiction responds to neighbors’ policy or expenditure level in similar 
13 The same reasoning also applies to property tax and corporation tax. However, 
contrary to many other countries, in Sweden, the local government can only levy 
taxes on income, not capital or properties. Introduction and Summary                                                              15 
way; while negative spatial autocorrelation occurs when they respond in 
the opposite way. 
 
Another aspect of fiscal interaction is the yardstick competition model. In 
the yardstick competition model, due to lack of information on its own 
local government, voters can use the performances of other jurisdictions 
as a benchmark to compare it to the performance of its own jurisdiction. 
Besley and Case (1995) develop and test a model of yardstick competition 
where voters in a local jurisdiction compare the performance of 
neighboring jurisdiction in order to evaluate the performance of its own 
politicians and policy-makers with regards to local tax setting. Since 
politicians (are assumed to) care about being reelected, they will take 
neighboring jurisdiction decisions into account before deciding on their 
own policy, which would lead to positive spatial autocorrelation. The 
result from Beasly and Case’s study supports their hypothesis that 
yardstick competition indeed influences the decision-making. Along with 
tax competition and yardstick competition, there are other possible 
sources of interaction among local governments as well: expenditure 
spillover, mimicking, and welfare competition for example (see Brueckner, 
2003 and Revelli, 2005). 
 
When estimating the models of fiscal interaction, findings of positive 
spatial autocorrelation (i.e. the slope of the reaction function is non-
negative) are consistent with yardstick competition, tax competition, 
mimicking and welfare competition models. Therefore, additional 
evidence is needed to discriminate between the models (Brueckner, 2003). 
Recently, there have been a number of empirical studies that make an 
effort to separate the sources of interaction. In a study on local property 16                                 Introduction and Summary 
tax rates in Italian cities, Bordignon, Cerniglia and Revelli (2003) try to 
discriminate between the tax competition and the yardstick competition 
hypothesis. They found a positive interdependence in the tax rate only in 
those cases where a strong majority did not back them up. The result 
points toward the source of interaction coming from yardstick 
competition.14 In a study on Swedish local income tax policies, Edmark 
and Ågren (2007) use a governmental reform that changed the system of 
tax base equalization to test for tax competition and yardstick 
competition. While they found weak evidence of tax competition, which is 
consistent with attracting mobile taxpayers, they found no evidence of 
support for the yardstick competition model.  
  
14 Other studies that try to separate tax competition from yardstick competition 
are those of Solé-Ollé (2003), Allers and Elhorst (2005), and Rattsö and Fiva 
(2007). They are all using the property tax rate (in Spain, the Netherlands, and 
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4. Summary of Paper [I], [II], and [III] 
Paper [I]: Exploring Differences in Expenditure for the 
Functionally Impaired: Neighborhood Interaction and the Federal 
Structure 
One of the reasons for the reform that implemented the LSS-act and 
transferred the responsibility for services of functionally impaired to the 
municipalities was to overcome regional differences in the provision of 
these services. However, both the number of individuals receiving services 
and the expenditure per capita differ greatly among municipalities. The 
purpose of this paper is to study the differences in expenditure for 
services to functionally impaired individuals among municipalities in 
Sweden. 
Besides traditional explanations such as differences in the number of 
disabled persons in the community, or economies of scale, other 
explanations are also studied here. Since the provision of LSS services is 
relatively new for the municipalities, the uncertainty at the service and 
expenditure level may be great. In line with this, a social interaction 
hypothesis is studied. It is hypothesized that the municipalities interact or 
mimic each other to minimize the cost of obtaining information on the 
“right” services or the expenditure level and, by mimicking, they can learn 
from their neighbors. In addition to the social interaction hypothesis, the 
influence of the former caregiver (county councils) is also taken into 
account.  
The empirical analysis is based on a dataset of 288 Swedish municipalities 
for the year 2003. The hypothesis of mimicking (and social) interaction 
among neighboring municipalities is studied by means of a spatial 18                                 Introduction and Summary 
autoregressive model, where the spending of one municipality depends on 
its own characteristics but also on the level of spending by its neighbors. 
To account for the possible influence of the county councils, the spatial 
autoregressive model is specified with and without explanatory variables 
for county councils.  
The results show a positive and significant spatial interaction term for 
model-specification without explanatory variables for county council, 
supporting that cooperation or mimicking among municipalities exists 
with regards to the expenditure level for functionally impaired. However, 
for the specification with county-council effects, the results show a non-
significant spatial interaction term. Therefore, it is not possible to 
determine if the positive spatial interaction first found is due to 
municipalities belonging to the same county council, or if it is because 
municipalities in the same county cooperate or mimic each other. The 
similarities among neighboring municipalities may be due the fact that the 
county councils used to be caregivers for individuals with functional 
impairments, and that the county councils are still those diagnosing 
individuals receiving LSS services. 
 
Paper [II]: Intergovernmental Grants and Local Public Expenditure 
Decision: Interaction due to Information Spillover 
This paper analyzes the effect of a new unconditional intergovernmental 
grant distributed to Swedish municipalities. The grant was implemented in 
2004 and is associated with expenditures for services to functionally 
impaired individuals. The grant is not based upon actual costs incurred by 
the municipalities; instead, it is based on nationally set standardized costs. 
Two main hypotheses are tested in this paper. First, similar to previous Introduction and Summary                                                              19 
studies on intergovernmental grants, the effect of the grant on related 
public expenditure is studied. Is this grant used to increase expenditures 
for functionally impaired?  
Second, and unlike other studies on intergovernmental grants, this study 
focus on the information on standardized costs associated with this grant, 
and study whether it causes municipalities to change their level of 
interaction among each other. It is hypothesized that the standardized 
costs may be viewed as a signal from the national government to the 
municipalities on what the right expenditure level should be. Here, it is 
argued that prior to the implementation of the grant, municipalities used 
the expenditure levels of other municipalities as information sources, and 
mimicked their neighbors in order to get the “right” service or 
expenditure level. After the implementation of the grant, and its 
associated information on standardized costs, the need to mimic should 
have decreased (or diminished), since the information could instead be 
obtained through the grant.  
The empirical analysis is based on 288 municipalities for the years 2001-
2007. The hypotheses are tested using a spatial panel autoregressive (SAR) 
model including fixed effects for time and municipalities. In the SAR 
model, the spatial autoregressive parameter measures the interaction 
among neighbors.15 The data set is divided into two time periods: 2001-
2003, corresponding to the period before the grant, and 2004-2007, 
corresponding to the period after the implementation of the grant. In 
order to support the hypothesis that the grant provides information that 
15 In this study, the neighbors are defined as a municipality’s neighbors and its 
neighbors’ neighbors. 20                                 Introduction and Summary 
causes the municipalities to mimic less, the interaction parameter should 
be positive in the first period, and zero (or decrease) in the second period.   
With regards to the first hypothesis, the result in this study is in line with 
other empirical studies; it shows that spending on services from grants 
exceeds that from a corresponding increase in income. With regards to the 
second hypothesis, the result supports the hypothesis of interaction 
among neighboring municipalities due to information spillover. In the first 
period, the interaction parameter is positive and significant, indicating 
spatial interaction among municipalities, which could be due to 
mimicking. In the second period, the interaction parameter is insignificant, 
which supports the hypothesis that the grant provides information and 
there is no need to mimic each other after the implementation of the 
grant. This result is interesting, since it shows that the source of spatial 
interactions among local governments can be due to information 
uncertainty. The information uncertainty aspect is important to take into 
account when implementing new services or decentralizing existing 
services to local governments, for example.  
 
Paper [III]: Do Local Public Expenditures for Functionally 
Impaired Crowd Out Other Local Public Expenditures? 
This paper examines the effect of the increasing expenditure for services 
to functionally impaired on other areas within the local government, with 
regards to the hypothesis of expenditure crowding out. To support the 
crowding out hypothesis, increases in expenditure for functionally 
impaired must have negative effects on other expenditures in such a way 
that it cannot be explained by other factors determining the expenditures. 
Although the local government has the autonomy to set its own local tax Introduction and Summary                                                              21 
rates, the income from taxes does not fully cover the municipal service 
provision. Therefore, when an expenditure program within the 
municipality is forced to redistribute its resources, other areas within the 
municipality are also likely to be affected. It is unlikely that every area will 
be affected in the same way, though. Areas that are heavily regulated by 
laws or for which strict guidelines are provided are not likely to be as 
affected as other areas. Furthermore, since it may be less noticeable to 
decrease resources in a large service area than in a small area, larger areas 
are likely to be affected to a greater extent than smaller areas.  
The empirical analysis is based on 288 municipalities for the years 1998-
2007. The crowding out hypothesis is tested on five spending categories: 
elderly & disabled care; education; social assistance, childcare & preschool; 
and culture & leisure, together constituting 90 percent of the total 
expenditures of the municipalities. The hypothesis is tested with an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) model and a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
model; both models including time and municipal fixed effects. It is 
possible that some spending categories may be simultaneously decided 
with the spending for LSS services; in such a case, the LSS expenditure is 
endogenous, making OLS estimates biased and inconsistent (Baltagi, 2002; 
Green, 2003). Therefore, to account for the bias in this case, instrumental 
variables must be used.  
The results from the empirical analysis show that the LSS expenditure 
variable is endogenous in the models for elderly & disabled care spending 
and education spending. The instruments used in the 2SLS estimation are 
the three most important determining factors for LSS expenditure. The 
tests confirm that the instruments are both valid and relevant here. For 22                                 Introduction and Summary 
the other three spending categories, LSS expenditure is not endogenous, 
thus making OLS sufficient. While the findings of this study do not 
support the existence of crowding out for the spending category of social 
assistance, childcare & preschool, and culture & leisure spending, it 
strongly supports crowding out of expenditures on elderly & disabled care 
and expenditures on education, both in a statistical and an economic 
sense. The results are credible, since both the elderly & disabled care and 
the education areas are large areas within the municipality sector and 
although regulated by law, it is not as strict as the LSS-act. 
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Abstract The purpose of this paper is to study the determinants of the differences
inexpenditure onservices forfunctionally impaired individuals among municipalities
in Sweden. Expenditure per capita differs greatly across municipalities, even when
accounting for the nature of the service. A spatial autoregressive model is used to test
whether the decisions on the expenditure level in a neighboring municipality affect
the municipality’s own expenditure. The results show that a positive spatial interac-
tion exists among neighbors. However, when controlling for level differences among
countiesthespatialinteractioncoefﬁcientbecomesnegativealthoughnotsigniﬁcantly
determined. Therefore, the positive interaction ﬁrst found can be interpreted either as
a result of differences in the way county councils diagnose individuals or due to inter-
action or mimicking among the neighbors belonging to the same county council.
JEL Classiﬁcation I18 · H72 · R12
1 Introduction
“The Act Concerning Support and Service for Persons with Certain Functional
Impairments”1 (LSS)2 is an entitlement-law that was established as part of the 1993
HandicapReforminSweden.TheLSSactisforindividualswith“majorandlong-term
functional disability”. The purpose of the act is to enable these individuals to obtain
equal opportunities in living conditions and full participation in the community. The
LSS-act is a complement to other laws; it gives individuals rights to obtain support
1 SFS 1993:387.
2 In Swedish: Lag om stöd och service till vissa funktionshindrade.
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and services that they might need in addition to other legislation. The responsibility
for providing LSS measures mainly lies with the municipalities.
The LSS activity is the fastest growing expenditure program of the municipalities.
Sinceitwasﬁrstimplemented in1994, theLSSacthasexpanded anumber oftimes—
which is the main reason for the increase in the LSS activity. While only about 0.5%
of the population is receiving any LSS assistance, the LSS provision consumes almost
19%ofthemunicipalities’totalsocialserviceexpenditures(NBHW2004)3.However,
the expenditure per capita differs greatly across municipalities; it ranges from 400 to
6,000SEK per capita (SOU 2002:103). This variation in expenditures can largely
be explained by the nature of the LSS provision where, for example, each person’s
individual needs differ from those of others. Nevertheless, even accounting for the
nature of the LSS provision, there are large differences that remain to be explained.
The purpose of this paper is to study the determinants of the differences in the
municipalities’ expenditures on LSS. Besides traditional explanations such as differ-
ences in the number of disabled persons in the community, or economies of scale,
other explanations are studied. In particular, the focus will be on the explanation that
municipalities interact in their expenditure behavior so as to avoid costs associated
withLSSorotherwiseengageinsocialinteractionwitheachother.Forexample,since
the LSS act is a relatively new law, the municipalities may be uncertain about some
of its implications—and they may therefore consider other municipalities as being
superior in their actions with regards to LSS. For this reason, the municipalities may
mimic each other so as to act in a similar way. Mimicking here implies that there is a
positive dependence between different municipalities’ expenditures. Another reason
for differences in the expenditure of LSS may be that the municipalities are engaging
ina“racetothebottom”4 witheachanother.However,sinceboththescopeoftheLSS
production as well as its expenditure per capita increases for every year, this explana-
tionmaynotbeveryplausible.Athirdexplanationisrelatedtothefactthatthecounty
councils are responsible for diagnosing those who may be eligible for LSS, implying
thattheexpenditure levels maydifferregionally. Priortothehandicap reformof1993,
the county councils were the sole providers of the LSS activity. If the differences are
only due to this fact—there should not be any remaining interaction when controlling
for the county council level.
The idea that the municipalities may affect each other in their decision making can
bereferredtoasspatial(orsocial)interaction,anditcanbestudiedviaspatialspillover
models, for example. Studying the reasons for differences in LSS expenditure among
municipalities is both interesting and important. First, it is an interesting area to study
since LSS is relatively new and is therefore to a large extent unexplored. Second,
the results may have important policy implications depending on the reasons for the
differences among the municipalities.
Thereareseveralstudiesonspatialspilloverintheliterature.Oneoftheﬁrstpapersis
thestudyofCaseetal.(1993),inwhichtheyusedaspillovermodeltostudythebudget
spillover among US states. They found that a state’s level of per capita expenditure is
3 The National Board of Health and Welfare.
4 A “race to the bottom” scenario is here interpreted as competition between municipalities leading to
progressive dismantling of LSS service production.
123Exploring differences in expenditure for the functionally impaired
positivelyandsigniﬁcantlyaffectedbytheexpenditurelevelsofitsneighbors.Another
example of a study of spatial interaction is Murdoch et al. (1993) article where they
studiedrecreationspilloversamongmunicipalitiesintheLosAngelesarea.Theyfound
that the municipalities responded positively to spillover from recreation expenditures
inneighboringmunicipalities,andthatmunicipalitieswithrelativelyhighincomesand
air pollution spend relatively less on local recreation. Since strategic interaction can
be studied via spillover models, the spillover model should be an appropriate tool for
testing whether municipalities do interact and inﬂuence each other when determining
the level of the LSS expenditure per capita.
In this paper, a spatial autoregressive model is used to test whether a neighboring
municipality’s decision on LSS expenditures affects the municipality’s own LSS
expenditure. In order to study neighborhood interaction, neighbors must be speciﬁed
in advance. The neighborhood weight matrix will be constructed in such a way that
everymunicipalityinareferencegrouphasequalweightregardlessofsize,population
orlocationofthemunicipality.Themunicipalitiesstudiedherearegroupedindifferent
sets of neighborhood speciﬁcations. For example, in one speciﬁcation, neighbors are
deﬁned to be those who share a common border. In another speciﬁcation, neighbors
are those who belong to the same functional urban region (FUR). In all, four different
neighborhood speciﬁcations are used. Using a spatial autoregressive model, it can be
determined whether the level of expenditure per capita for the LSS activity may be
inﬂuenced by interaction among municipalities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the LSS-Act,
its background and its development. Section 3 presents theory, neighborhood matrix,
and an empirical model which estimates spatial interaction among municipalities.
Section4presentsdataandempiricalﬁndings,whileconcludingremarkscanbefound
in Sect. 5.
2L S SA C T
“TheActConcerningSupportandServiceforPersonswithCertainFunctionalImpair-
ments” (LSS) is a law to guarantee individuals with major and long-term functional
disability equality in living conditions and full participation in the community. The
LSS Act contains provisions relating to measures for special support and special ser-
vicesforthosewithanintellectualdisability,autismoraconditionresemblingautism;
or for those with a signiﬁcant and permanent intellectual impairment that occurred
afterbraindamageinadulthood, orforthosewithothermajorandpermanent physical
or mental impairments not due to normal aging. Individuals who belong to any of the
above groups are entitled to support and services if they need such assistance in their
daily lives and if their needs are not satisﬁed in some other way.
ThemeasuresincludedintheLSSactaredesignedtoensurethatindividualsentitled
toLSSwillhavegoodlivingconditions.Themeasure(s)shouldbelastingandadapted
to the individual needs of the recipient and be framed in such a way that they are
easily accessible for those who need them and enhance the ability of the latter to
live an independent life (www.independentliving.org). The LSS act consists of ten
measures which include Counseling and other personal support; Personal assistance;
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Table 1 Total expenditures on LSS activity (NBHW 2001–2004)
LSS/LASS 2001 2002 2003 2004
Billion SEK 20.42 2 .52 5 .12 6 .5
Increase from previous year 6.80% 10.30% 11.60% 5.60%
In the year 2000, total expenditures less LASS compensation amounted to 19.1billion SEK, current prices
Dailyactivities;Reliefserviceinthehome;andLivinginfamilyhomesorhomeswith
special services for children and young people (SFS 1993:387).
The responsibility for the LSS activity mostly resides with the municipality. While
the municipalities are responsible for nine of the ten LSS measures, the county coun-
cil is responsible for the measure “Counseling and other personal support”. However,
some municipalities have, by agreement, taken over the responsibility also for this
measure. In connection with the Handicap reform of 1993, the “Assistance Beneﬁt
Act”(LASS)wasalsoestablished.TheLASSactiswheretheSocialSecurityAdmin-
istration assists LSS individuals in need of personal assistance more than 20hours per
week. Thus, the municipalities have the ﬁnancial responsibility for the ﬁrst 20hours
and the Social Security Administration for the exceeding hours (NBHW 2006a,b).
There has been a steady increase in the LSS expenditure. During 1997–2001, the
municipalities’ share of LSS expenditures increased with a yearly average of 11.3%
(SOU 2002:103),5 and it is also the fastest growing activity of the municipalities. The
share of the municipalities’ resources for the disabled was about 11% in 2004, as
compared to 9% in 2000 (NBHW 2006).
In 2001, the number of individuals receiving at least one LSS measure was 47,283
(NBHW2001).Thiscorrespondstoapproximately0.6%ofthepopulationaged0–64,6
or 0.5% of the whole population. In 2004, the number of individuals receiving at least
one measure had increased to 52,995 (NBHW 2004). The percentage increase over
the 4years was 12.8%. The costs of the LSS activities are substantial; Table 1 presents
an overview of the municipalities’ total expenditure on LSS for the years 2001–2004.
The net expenditures7 for LSS in 2001 amounted to 20.4billion SEK—which is
about 20% of the total municipal expenditures of the “Care of the Elderly and Dis-
abled”, and 17% of the total Social Services expenditure in that year (NBHW 2001).
In 2004, the corresponding numbers had increased to 26.5billion SEK for the LSS
activity, which is 23.5% of “Care of the Elderly and Disabled” and 18.9% of the total
expenditures of the Social Services (NBHW 2004). Table 2 shows the average LSS
expenditure per capita for the whole country.
There are major differences among the municipalities in their LSS expenditure per
capita.Asmentioned,theexpendituresrangefromapproximately400–6,000SEKper
capita. To a great extent, this variation in expenditures can be explained by the nature
5 Statens Offentliga Utredningar, SOU.
6 LSS measures are granted to individuals aged 0–64.
7 Net expenditure refers to gross expenditure minus internal revenue; minus sale-revenues from other
municipalities and county councils; exclusive compensations from Swedish Social Insurance Agency for
LASS services, and exclusive expenditure for preventive activities and revenues from rent.
123Exploring differences in expenditure for the functionally impaired
Table 2 Average expenditure
on LSS per capita in SEK,
current prices
Year Expenditure per Expenditure Expenditure per
capita, age 0–64 per capita person receiving LSS
2001 2,899 2,333 423,627
2002 2,949 2,360 417,981
2003 3,211 2,587 438,875
2004 3,371 2,708 445,106
of the LSS production. While LSS naturally depends on the speciﬁc needs of the
individuals and the number of measures required, it also depends on the concentration
of individuals with a need for LSS services in the municipalities. Before the handicap
reform of 1993, the county councils were responsible for the care that later became
deﬁnedasLSS-care.Aspartofthehandicapreform,theresponsibilityforwhatbecame
the LSS care was transferred to the municipalities. The care that was transferred from
the county councils to municipalities’ regime included resident homes for adults and
residenthomesforchildren.Thus,themunicipalitieswheretheseresidenthomeswere
located received a higher share of individuals with LSS needs (SOU 2002:103). Con-
sequently, those municipalities where the county councils’ activities were previously
located also have a higher per capita LSS expenditure. However, even accounting for
thenatureoftheLSSprovision,therearelargedifferencesthatremaintobeexplained.
Descriptive statistics for individuals (per 10,000 inhabitants) with LSS services in the
municipalities for the years 2000–2004 are presented in Fig. 1. In addition, a map
of the distribution of the number of individuals (per 10,000 inhabitants) with LSS
services in the municipalities in the year 2003 is presented in Fig. 2 in Appendix A.
The differences among municipalities are also clear when comparing the average
expenditure on LSS per person receiving LSS. The average municipality expenditure
per person receiving LSS-measure ranges from 103,711 to 791,132 SEK in 2001.
Furthermore, the expenditure also increases every year. The following years, 2002–
2004,showasimilartrend(NBHW2001,2002,2003,2004).Moreover,thedifferences
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Fig. 1 Individuals with LSS Services in the Municipalities (per 10,000 inhabitants) 2000-2004 (NBHW
2001, NBHW 2002, NBHW 2003, NBHW 2004, NBHW 2005a). Note: For the years 2000-2002 data for
a few municipalities is missing. In these cases, the missing data has been replaced by data for the next
available year. For the year 2000, the municipalities Ljusnarsberg, Sorsele, Ydre, Älmhult and Ödeshög
have missing data. For the year 2001, the municipalities Ljusnarsberg, Ydre, Åsele, and Överkalix have
missing data. Finally, for the year 2002, Ljusnarsberg and Nora have missing data
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in LSS expenditures are not limited to be just among municipalities, they are also
evident among counties. For example, for the year 2003 the per capita expenditure for
LSS ranges between 3,142 and 4,037 SKR among the counties in the country.
TheexpendituresonLSSactivitiesconstituteasubstantialpartofthemunicipalities’
service production; however, the resources are limited and many of the municipalities
havenotfulﬁlledtheirobligationsaccordingtotheLSSAct.Forexample,oneproblem
has been that municipalities are denying applications and/or are not carrying out the
approved applications or the verdict according to LSS in time. The National Board of
Health and Welfare has examined this issue in cooperation with the County Boards.
They reported that there are large regional differences, and that some municipalities
systematically deny certain LSS applications that they are not able to fulﬁll within
reasonable time (NBHW 2005a,b).
3 Theory and empirical model
In economics, social interaction models describe the behavior of agents as affected
by the characteristics or behavior of other agents; agents interact through their cho-
sen action (Manski 1993, 2000). The cause of interaction among economic agents is
distinguished to three hypotheses: endogenous interaction, contextual interaction and
correlated effects. According to the endogenous interaction hypothesis, the propen-
sity of an agent to behave varies with the behavior of the group. The contextual (or
exogenous) interaction states that individual action varies with the exogenous charac-
teristics of the group members. The correlated effect is that agents in the same group
behave similarly because they have similar individual characteristics or face simi-
lar institutional environments. Endogenous and exogenous interaction state ways in
whichagentsmightbeinﬂuencedbytheirsocialenvironment,whilecorrelatedeffects
express a non-social occurrence (Manski 2000).
Strategic (and social) interaction among governments can be studied via spillover
models, where the spending of one jurisdiction depends on its own characteristics but
alsoonthelevelofspendingbyitsneighbors.Caseetal.(1993)usedaspillovermodel
tostudythebudgetspilloveramongUSstates.Murdochetal.(1993)studiedrecreation
spillovers among municipalities in the Los Angeles area. Since the direct effect of
strategic interaction can be studied using the means of a spillover model, this model
can be used to test whether municipalities inﬂuence each other when determining the
level of LSS expenditure per capita.
Asstated,inspillovermodels,onejurisdictionisdirectlyaffectedbythedecision(s)
of jurisdictions elsewhere. Applied to the LSS expenditure problem, one municipality
decides its own level of LSS expenditure per capita, but is also directly affected by the
level of LSS expenditures per capita of other municipalities.
3.1 A spatial autoregressive model for local interaction
The municipality i’s per capita expenditures of LSS (log), Li, depend on the munici-
pality’s own characteristics, Xi, as well as its neighbors’ per capita LSS expenditures
(log), L j.
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wijL j + Xiβ + εi (1)
In matrix form, the model is written as:
L = φWL+ Xβ + ε (2)
where L isa(n×1)vectorofLSSexpenditurespercapita;φ istheparameterfor“local
interaction”; W is a (n×n) weight matrix with elements wij; X is a (n×k) matrix of
explanatory variables for the municipalities; β is a (k ×1) vector of parameters; and ε
is a (n ×1) vector of error terms. Here, the error terms are assumed to be independent
and normally distributed with a constant variance.8
3.2 Econometric issues
With spatial interaction, multidirectional dependence may be present; errors for one
observationarelikelytoberelatedtotheerrorsinneighboringobservations,i.e.,spatial
dependence(Anselin1988).Since L appearsonbothsidesoftheequation,multidirec-
tional dependence between the dependent variables exists. The resulting correlation
means that ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the parameters of Eq. (2)a r e
biased and inconsistent. Therefore, to account for multidirectional dependence, a spa-
tial lag model is used to make the error term uncorrelated between the neighbors.
Spatial error dependence arises when ε includes omitted variables that are them-
selves spatially dependent. When spatial error dependence is ignored, estimation of
the model can present false evidence for spatial interaction. One way of dealing with
this is to estimate the equation by Maximum Likelihood under the assumption that
spatial error dependence is absent, and then test to verify the absence. The robust
test of Anselin et al. (1996) can then be used to test if spatial dependence is present
(Brueckner 2003). In this paper, this is the method used; a reduced form9 of Eq. (2)
will be estimated using the maximum likelihood method.
3.3 The weight matrix
The weight matrix must be speciﬁed in advance since it is not possible to estimate
neighborhood pattern on cross-sectional data. The weight matrix consists of 288
municipalities. In this paper, neighbors have been deﬁned in four different ways. In
the speciﬁcation “GEO”, it is assumed that the neighbors are all those municipalities
8 An alternative way of specifying the spatial process, rather than specifying it as in Eqs. (1)a n d( 2), is
to specify it in the error term (Anselin 2003). Formally: L = Xβ + U and U = γWU + ε.H o w e v e r ,
since the hypothesis in this paper is that the municipalities interact with each other in order to decide on
their own expenditure level, the model speciﬁed in Eqs. (1)a n d( 2) is used, and I will later on test for error
dependence.
9 The reduced form is obtained by solving (2)f o rL :L = (I − ϕW)−1Xβ + (I − ϕW)−1ε.
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that share a common border. The neighbors in the speciﬁcation “GEOLAN” are the
municipalities within a county council that share a common border. In the “FUR”
speciﬁcation, neighbors are based on a functional urban regional area, where each
regionconsistsofuptofouradjacentmunicipalitiescooperatingwithregardtoindustry,
employment and communication (SCB, MIS 2003:1). Following Case et al. (1993),
thefourthspeciﬁcation,“ALPHA”,isspeciﬁedasanintentionallyabsurdmatrix.Here,
the neighbors are based upon an alphabetical index, where neighbors are divided into
groups of four according to alphabetical order (i.e. the ﬁrst four municipalities are one
region of neighbors, and the next four municipalities are another region of neighbors
etc). The “ALPHA” speciﬁcation is only used for comparison.
Theweightmatrixisrow-standardized,i.e.eachelementisdividedbytherowsum.
Thus, each row will sum to one. The neighboring municipalities’ expenditure on LSS
is assumed to affect the expenditures in municipality i with a weighted average of
the neighboring municipalities’ expenditures. The four different speciﬁcations of the
weight matrixare based upon contiguity. Let wij = 1/Mi for municipalities j deﬁned
to be neighbors to i and wij = 0 otherwise; where Mi is the number of neighbors to
municipality i. Then, the total “spillin” can be written as:

j =i wijL j.
4 Data and empirical ﬁndings
The data set used in the present study has been collected from Statistics Sweden
and The National Board of Health and Welfare. Data refers to the year 2003 and it
includes the number of individuals receiving any LSS measure and the number of
individuals receiving each measure. The dependent variable used in the analysis is the
logarithmofLSSexpenditurepercapitaage0–64.Thisisthecostformeasuresaccord-
ingtoLSSexcludingtheLASScompensationfromSocialAdministration.Asmallpart
of the total expenditures is expenditures on measures for individuals older than 65.10
4.1 Explanatory variables
The LSS measure variables are deﬁned as “Individuals receiving a particular measure
per total number of individuals receiving any LSS measure”. Explanatory variables
are included for §17-agreements 11 between municipalities. Using §17-agreements, a
municipalitycanretainthecostresponsibilityforpersonslivinginanothermunicipality
and thus does not have to execute the measure itself. This is used by, for example,
small municipalities that do not have the suitable measure for some individuals, for
example, special resident homes. Instead, by agreement, the LSS individual moves
to a resident home in another municipality that can provide the proper care, while
the original municipality retains the responsibility for the cost. That is, the submit-
ting municipality is accountable for the cost incurred by the treating municipality.
The §17 variables are deﬁned as a percentage of the number of agreements per total
number of individuals receiving any LSS measure. The idea of using these as
10 LSS measures are not approved after the age of 64; however, measures approved prior to the age of 65
can be continued after the age of 65.
11 §17 refers to a section in the LSS act (SFS 1993:387)
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explanatoryvariablesistoaccountforeconomiesofscale;boththe“receiving”andthe
“transmitting” municipalities get a lower LSS expenditure per capita with the §17-
agreements. Moreover, an explanatory variable for a 350million SEK LSS-speciﬁc
grant is included. This was a grant that was divided among a number of municipalities
that had extraordinarily high costs for their LSS production in the years 2001–2003.
The year 2003 is the ﬁrst (and only) year where both data for the speciﬁc LSS grant
and for the §17-agreements is available, and since these are important variables for
the determinants of LSS expenditure—it makes the year 2003 ideal to study.
Additionalexplanatoryvariablesareusedformunicipalcharacteristicssuchaspop-
ulation density and tax base per capita. The population density variable is included to
capture, for example, economics of scale. As the population increases in one speciﬁc
area, the expenditure per capita is expected to decrease. General grants per capita of
income equalization and cost equalization are also included among the explanatory
variables.Thegeneralgrantisexpectedtohaveapositiveeffectonthedependentvari-
able. If a municipality receives general grants, they may choose to use it for their LSS
services production, therefore, in that case, the LSS expenditure per capita increases
withgeneralgrants.Finally,intheanalysis,thenaturallogarithmofpopulationisused
since the effect of population is likely to be nonlinear. Descriptive statistics including
minimum and maximum values for the relevant variables are presented in Table 3.
There are 290 municipalities and 21 county councils in Sweden. All municipalities
except two are included in the analysis. Ydre is excluded due to missing data and
Gotland is excluded due to the fact that the municipality and the county council
coincide. Therefore, the analysis consists of twenty county councils with a varying
number of municipalities. Since county councils may play a signiﬁcant role in the
determinants of LSS expenditures per capita, dummy variables indicating whether
municipalities belong to the same county council level will be included in some of the
model speciﬁcations tested.
4.2 Empirical ﬁndings
In this subsection, and the following, the results from the empirical analysis are pre-
sented and discussed. There are three neighborhood speciﬁcations tested with and
without county council speciﬁc effects, making it a total of six model speciﬁcations.12
Forthespeciﬁcationswithoutcontrollingvariablesforcountycouncils,theresultindi-
catesthatinteractionamongmunicipalitiesexists,possiblypointingtowardmimicking
or interaction. The estimate of the interaction term is positive and signiﬁcant for the
three speciﬁcations without explanatory variables for county councils. However, for
the speciﬁcations with explanatory variables for county councils, the interaction term
isnownegativeandnonsigniﬁcant,indicatingthatthereisnomimickingorinteraction
among municipalities with regards to LSS expenditure levels. Since the negative
interaction term is not signiﬁcantly different from zero, there is no statistical evidence
that-forthethreemodelspeciﬁcationswithexplanatoryvariablesforcountycouncils-
the municipalities interact with each other in determining the LSS expenditure levels.
12 Not counting the Alpha-speciﬁcations (which are just for comparison).
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Type of LSS-measure;
Companion service, percent 17.32 12.81 0 61.26
Counseling and other personal support, percent 23.14 32.59 0 145.00
Daily activities, percent 44.01 11.72 0 73.08
Personal assistance, percent 9.17 9.62 0 45.16
Personal contact, percent 30.52 13.34 0 73.68
Relief service in the home, percent 4.28 5.06 0 20.59
Residential arrangements with special service for adults,
percent
34.29 12.34 0 65.59
Livinginfamilyhomesorhomeswithspecialservicefor
children and young persons, percent
2.01 3.68 0 20.59
Short period of supervision for schoolchildren aged
above 12, percent
6.92 6.21 0 35.00
LSS-speciﬁc variables
Expenditure for LSS-activity per capita age 0–64, SEK 3218 1056 835 7975
Expenditure for LSS per Individual receiving any LSS
assistance, SEK
438781 111476 177415 973034
Expenditure for LSS-activity per capita age 0–64, SEK
(log)
3.48 0.15 2.92 3.90
Expenditure for LSS-per Individual receiving any LSS
assistance, SEK (log)
5.63 0.11 5.25 5.99
LSS-grant, grant per person receiving any LSS activity,
SEK
6727 20965 0 192683
Individuals receiving any LSS measure per capita age
0–64, percent
0.75 0.23 0.26 1.64
Number of measures per capita age 0–64, percent 1.47 0.65 0.22 5.49
§17-agreements of cost responsibility, agreements as a
percentage of total number of individuals receiving any
LSS measure
4.46 6.09 0 41.38
§17-agreements of measure responsibility with munic-
ipality agreements as a percentage of total number of
individuals receiving any LSS measure
1.14 3.15 0 26.14
Municipality-speciﬁc characteristics
Grant-income, SEK per capita 6758 5183 –15698 22144
Population density, population per km2 128 422 0 4058
Population size (log), age 0–64 4.17 0.40 3.26 5.81
Tax base per capita 122491 17184 99291 250576
“The Type of LSS-measure” variables are measured as the number of individuals receiving each measure
as a percentage of the total number of individuals receiving any LSS measure
4.3 Spatial dependence test
In this paper, two different tests have been used in order to determine the spatial
dependence of the models: Likelihood Ratio (LR) test and Lagrange Multiplier (LM)
test. Here, the LR test is a test on the spatial lag coefﬁcient φ. It tests the speciﬁed
spatiallagmodelagainstastandardregressionmodelwiththesamesetofexplanatory
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Table 4 Spatial error and spatial lag dependence tests
GEO GEOLAN FUR ALPHA
Value Prob Value Prob Value Prob Value Prob
Models excluding county councils as explanatory variables
Test for Spatial Lag Dependence
Likelihood Ratio Test 7.60 0.01 11.93 0.00 7.96 0.01 0.04 0.84
Test for Spatial Error Dependence
Lagrange Multiplier Test 0.11 0.92 0.22 0.64 1.49 0.22 0.57 0.45
Models including county councils as explanatory variables
Test for Spatial Lag Dependence
Likelihood Ratio Test 0.48 0.49 0.52 0.47 0.80 0.37 0.38 0.54
Test for Spatial Error Dependence
Lagrange Multiplier Test 1.28 0.26 1.58 0.21 0.12 0.73 0.10 0.75
variables with φ set to zero (Anselin 1995). The second test, the LM test, is to test if
spatial error dependence remains in the residuals. Test statistics for the two tests are
presented in Table 4.
For themodel-speciﬁcations without controlling variables forcountry councils, the
signiﬁcance testoftheLRteststatisticindicates thatthereisspatialinteraction among
municipalities. However, for the model-speciﬁcations with controlling variables for
county councils, the non-signiﬁcance test of the LR test statistic indicates that there is
no spatial dependence among municipalities.
As mentioned, the next test, the Lagrange Multiplier test, is to test if spatial depen-
dence remains in the residuals. If the spatial lag model speciﬁed is the correct one, no
spatial dependence should remain in the residuals (Anselin 1995). The test statistics
for all six speciﬁcations are non-signiﬁcant, which is an indication of there being no
spatial dependence remaining in the residual. Consequently, taking both the LR and
the LM tests into account, this could then be interpreted as the spatial lag models that
exclude explanatory variables for county councils being correctly speciﬁed. However,
asdiscussedintheLSS-section,countycouncilsusedtobetheprovidersoftheservices
that later became deﬁned as LSS services—this could mean that the interaction result
just obtained is not “true” interaction, but a result of the underlying federal structure.
Therefore, to determine which set of model-speciﬁcation is the best, a likelihood ratio
test is performed.
4.4 Should explanatory variables for county councils be included
in the model-speciﬁcation?
Sincethetestonspatialdependenceintheerrortermwasnon-signiﬁcantforbothtypes
of speciﬁcations (withand without explanatory variables forcounty councils) the next
step is to determine which of the spatial lag model speciﬁcations is the right one, the
one without explanatory variables for county councils or the one with explanatory
variables for county councils. A likelihood ratio test is performed to determine if the
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Table 5 Likelihood ratio test statistics
Model Log likelihood Likelihood ratio test P value
GEO excl variables for county councils 315.08 66.06 0.00
GEO incl variables for county councils 348.11
GEOLAN excl variables for county councils 317.25 61.76 0.00
GEOLAN incl variables for county councils 348.13
FUR excl variables for county councils 309.32 67.02 0.00
FUR incl variables for county councils 342.83
twotypesofspeciﬁcationsdifferfromeachotherandifthespeciﬁcationforthecounty
council type can explain the reasons for differences in the LSS expenditure among
the municipalities to a higher degree. The likelihood ratio test is a statistical test of
the goodness-of-ﬁt between two models (speciﬁcations). Table 5 presents the results
from the likelihood ratio test between the two speciﬁcations.
The likelihood ratio statistic is
λ =− 2(ln LR − ln LU)
where LU is the unconstrained value of the likelihood function and LR is the value of
the restricted likelihood function (Green 2003).
From the test statistic in Table 5, it is evident that the speciﬁcations that include
explanatoryvariablesforcountycouncilsaremoresuitable.EventhoughtheLagrange
Multiplier test showed no spatial dependence in the error term for either of the speciﬁ-
cations,theLikelihoodRatioTestindicatesthatitisthespeciﬁcationswithexplanatory
variablesforcountycouncilsthattoahigherdegreeexplainthereasonsfordifferences
in the LSS expenditure among the municipalities. The result in Table 5 conﬁrms the
inclusion of county council variables in the speciﬁcations.
4.5 Determinants of LSS-services expenditure
Table6presenttheresultsofestimatingthemunicipalities’LSSexpenditurepercapita
(log)asthedependentvariable.13 Sincethespeciﬁcationsthatincludeexplanatoryvari-
ables for county councils are superior to those that do not, these are the only results
presentedinthepaper.14,15 Here,geographicborder(GEO);geographicborderwithin
13 SincetheLSSservices productionislikely toexhibiteconomicsofscale, an analysis with thedependent
variable LSS expenditure per individual receiving LSS services has also been performed. The results of the
analysis are presented in Table 7 in Appendix B, along with a brief discussion. The results are similar to
the results obtained for the dependent variable LSS expenditure per capita (0–64) which are presented in
Table 6 here in the result section.
14 The estimates for the spatial lag model speciﬁcation without explanatory variables for county councils
can be obtained from the author upon request.
15 The estimates for the county council dummies are not presented here, but can be found in Table 8,
Appendix C along with a brief discussion.
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Table 6 Estimation results for LSS expenditure per capita age 0–64, models include dummy variables for
county councils
Variable GEO GEOLAN FURa ALPHA
Estimate z value Estimate z value Estimate z value Estimate z value
W_LSSEXP neighboring
municipalities
−0.0487 −0.73 −0.0442 −0.77 −0.0448 −0.88 −0.0319 −0.63
Constant 2.5511 8.82 2.5394 9.45 2.571 10.19 2.4884 10.06
LSS-measure variables
Companion service 4.27E − 04 0.77 4.05E − 04 0.73 3.46E − 04 0.62 4.41E − 04 0.80
Counseling and other
personal support
1.09E − 03 2.70 1.09E − 03 2.69 1.08E − 03 2.66 1.08E − 03 2.67
Daily activities 2.98E − 03 4.58 2.99E − 03 4.59 2.98E − 03 4.54 3.01E − 03 4.61
Personal assistance 8.13E − 04 1.30 8.16E − 04 1.31 7.87E − 04 1.26 8.06E − 04 1.29
Personal contact 5.73E − 04 1.09 5.59E − 04 1.07 4.85E − 04 0.92 5.45E − 04 1.04
Relief service in the home 1.64E − 03 1.30 1.61E − 03 1.28 1.70E − 03 1.35 1.60E − 03 1.28
Living in family homes or
homes with special
service for children and
young persons
−7.76E − 04 −0.53 −7.96E − 04 −0.55 −9.84E − 04 −0.68 −8.78E − 04 −0.61
Residential arrangements
with special service for
adults
2.50E − 03 3.98 2.50E − 03 3.98 2.46E − 03 3.92 2.43E − 03 3.84
Short stay away from the
home
1.07E − 03 1.64 1.07E − 03 1.64 1.09E − 03 1.66 1.08E − 03 1.64
Short period of supervision
for schoolchildren aged
above 12
1.11E − 03 1.21 1.12E − 03 1.22 1.02E − 03 1.11 1.12E − 03 1.22
Individuals receiving any
LSS measure per capita
age 0–64
5.45E − 01 6.24 5.46E − 01 6.25 5.42E − 01 6.19 5.42E − 01 6.21
Number of measures per
capita age 0–64
−8.34E − 02 −1.99 −8.34E − 02 −1.99 −8.14E − 02 −1.94 −8.14E − 02 −1.94
§17-agreements of cost
responsibility








8.66E − 06 2.88 8.57E − 06 2.84 8.34E − 06 2.74 8.64E − 06 2.87
LSS-grant 1.33E − 06 5.43 1.33E − 06 5.44 1.34E − 06 5.45 1.32E − 06 5.39
Tax base per capita 1.61E − 06 2.04 1.59E − 06 2.01 1.45E − 06 1.81 1.62E − 06 2.04
Municipal characteristics
Population density. inv per
km2
−2.90E − 05 −2.16 −2.92E − 05 −2.17 −3.02E − 05 −2.24 −2.91E − 05 −2.16
Population size (log). age
0–64
7.12E − 02 4.26 7.13E − 02 4.27 7.17E − 02 4.25 7.26E − 02 4.34
Log Likelihood 348.108 348.128 342.828 348.057
Nobs 288 288 284 288
For computational reasons the municipalities of Norrtälje, Västervik, Sollefteå and Örnsköldsvik are ex-
cluded from the analysis of the FUR neighborhood matrix, leaving 284 municipalities to be analyzed (these
municipalitieshavenoneighborsasneighborisdeﬁnedinthefunctionalurbanregionneighborhoodmatrix)
a The estimates for the dummy variables for county councils are presented in Table 8, Appendix C
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a county (GEOLAN); and functional urban regions (FUR); respectively, are used to
deﬁne neighbors.16
In most cases, the sign and signiﬁcance do not change between the two sets
of speciﬁcations (i.e. when county council variables are included), except for the
Interaction term,t h eCounseling and other personal supportterm and the Residential
Arrangementswithspecialservicesforadultsterm.Inthemodel-speciﬁcationswithout
explanatory variables for county councils, the term for Counseling and other personal
support was positive but non signiﬁcant. When controlling for county councils, the
term is still positive, but now it is signiﬁcant. The Residential Arrangements with spe-
cial services for adults and the previously mentioned Interaction term have changed to
negative; however, neither estimate is signiﬁcant, which makes it impossible to draw
any conclusions from this.
As mentioned in the data section, the LSS measure variables are measured as
“Individuals with the (measure) per total number of individuals receiving any LSS
measure”. Therefore, the result can be understood as when the shares of individuals
with the measure Daily Activities increases, this has a positive effect on the LSS
expenditurespercapita(log),i.e.,theLSSexpenditurepercapitaincreases.Inthesame
way, when the share of individuals with the measure Living in family homes or homes
withspecialserviceforadultsincreases,sodoestheexpenditurespercapita(log).The
results also indicate that municipalities with §17 cost responsibility agreements have
higherexpenditurespercapita,andmunicipalitieswith§17-agreementsofperforming
theservicehavelowerLSSexpenditurespercapita.Boththeseresultsareasexpected,
since §17-agreements only involve individuals with extensive needs. The share of
“Individuals receiving any LSS measure per capita age 0–64” is also positive and
signiﬁcant as expected. The number of measures granted in a municipality does not,






As expected, the coefﬁcients for tax base, grant income and LSS grant all have
a positive and signiﬁcant impact on municipalities’ expenditure level on LSS per
capita. Moreover, the coefﬁcient for grant income is greater than the coefﬁcient for
tax base, which can be taken as evidence of the ﬂypaper effect.18 The ﬂypaper effect
refers to the occurrence where expenditure increases more from grants than from an
16 As is evident in Table 6, the spatial interaction (lag) coefﬁcient is negative and non signiﬁcant
for all speciﬁcations that includes explanatory variables for county councils. Furthermore, the ALPHA
neighborhood speciﬁcation does not differ much from GEO, GEOLAN, and FUR neighborhood speciﬁca-
tion. For that reason, an analysis without the spatial speciﬁcation (OLS) was performed. Even though the
quantitative results differ somewhat between the Spatial Lag Models and the OLS model, the qualitative
results are the same. The OLS results can be obtained from the author upon requests.
17 However, this term is signiﬁcant at the 10% level for the model speciﬁcations with explanatory variables
for county councils.
18 Courant et al. (1979) coined the term “ﬂypaper effect” as a result of Arthur Okun’s observation “money
sticks where it hits”.
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equivalent increase in income. However, when comparing the LSS grant and the tax
base coefﬁcients, there is no evidence of the ﬂypaper effect, thus implying that the
LSS grant is treated as any other tax income. Here, the municipalities may use the
LSS grant to decrease the level of taxes in their municipalities.
5 Concluding remarks
TheLSSservicesisthefastestgrowingactivityofthemunicipalitiesanditsexpenditure
has steadily increased over the years, even though the expenditure per capita varies
greatly across municipalities. This variation in expenditures can to a great extent be
explained by the nature of the LSS provision—where each person’s individual needs
differs from others’—but even accounting for this, large differences remain. In this
paper,thedeterminantsofdifferencesinthemunicipalities’expendituresonLSShave
beenstudied.Byconstructingdifferentneighborhoodspeciﬁcations,socialinteraction
among neighbors was studied as one explanation. Another explanation studied is
related to the fact that county councils used to be the primary care givers of what later
became the municipalities LSS service. In an effort to account for differences due to
county councils, the model was speciﬁed with and without explanatory variables for
county councils.
The results show a positive and signiﬁcant interaction term for model-speciﬁcation
withoutexplanatoryvariablesforcountycouncil,indicatingcooperationormimicking
among municipalities. However, due to the potential inﬂuence of county councils,
speciﬁcationswithoutexplanatoryvariablesforcountycouncilmaynotbesatisfactory.
The model was therefore speciﬁed with explanatory variable for county councils, and
theresultsshowa(negative)nonsigniﬁcantinteractionterm.Sincetheinteractionterm
is non-signiﬁcant, this may indicate that for LSS-services, the municipalities does not
engage in mimicking or interaction when determining their LSS level. However, it
is not possible to determine if the positive interaction among municipalities found
in the speciﬁcations without county councils explanatory variables are caused by
municipalities belonging to the same county council, or if it is due to the fact that
the municipalities in the same county cooperates or mimic each other. For example,
the interaction may be due to county councils’ differences in the level of diagnosis
for individuals with LSS services, which would affect the municipalities differently.
The similarities among neighboring municipalities may instead be due the fact that
the county councils used to be caregivers for individuals with functional impairments,
and that the county councils are still the ones diagnosing individuals receiving LSS
services.Itisclear,however,thatthecountycouncilsplayalargerolewhenexplaining
the differences in the LSS expenditures among municipalities.
The differences in LSS expenditure per capita among the municipalities as well as
the steady increase in LSS production have advocated a change in the system. After
several investigations on how to best change the system, the parliament decided to
implement “The Act of LSS expenditure equalization system” starting in 2004 (SFS
2003:386–387).Thepurposeofthesystemistoequalizeandseetoitthatallmunicipal-
ities have the same basic conditions in their LSS activity. Further studies are needed
to determine the effect of the “LSS expenditure equalization system” and what the
implications for the municipalities are. Therefore, one study could be to incorporate
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the LSS expenditure system into the models to study if the municipalities’ behavior
has changed since the system was implemented. Furthermore, in order to determine if
interaction among municipalities exists with regards to LSS expenditure, it would be
vitaltostudyifthemunicipalitieshavechangedtheirbehavioraccordingtotheirneigh-
borhood group after the implementation of the LSS expenditure equalization system.
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Appendix A: Map of the number of individuals with LSS services per
municipality in Sweden 2003
  Quantile Map
1st range:
10-47 individuals with LSS services 
(per 10,000 inhabitants)
2nd range: 
48-58 individuals with LSS services 
(per 10,000 inhabitants)   
3rd range: 
59-70 individuals with LSS services 
(per 10,000 inhabitants) 
4th range: 
71-126 individuals with LSS 
services (per 10,000 inhabitants) 
Fig. 2 Individuals with LSS Services in the Municipalities (per 10,000 inhabitants), (NBHW 2003)
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Appendix B: Estimation results for the dependent variable LSS expenditure per
individual receiving LSS services
Since the LSS services production is likely to exhibit economics of scale, an analysis
withthedependentvariableLSSexpenditureperindividualreceivingLSSserviceshas
also been performed in an effort to capture it. The results of the analysis are presented
Table 7 Estimation result for (log) LSS expenditure per LSS individualand for (log) LSS expenditure per
capita (0–64), both models include dummy variables for county councils
Dependent Variable log LSSexp/LSSind logLSSexp/cap0–64
Explanatory Variables Estimate z value Estimate z value
W_LSSEXP neighboring municipalities −0.04896 −0.71 −0.0442 −0.77
Constant 5.46142 13.14 2.5394 9.45
LSS speciﬁc variables
Companion service −4.17E−04 −0.79 4.05E−04 0.73
Counseling and other personal support 4.30E−04 1.11 1.09E−03 2.69
Daily activities 2.11E−03 3.37 2.99E−03 4.59
Personal assistance −3.72E−05 −0.06 8.16E−04 1.31
Personal contact −3.50E−04 −0.70 5.59E−04 1.07
Relief service in the home 1.39E−03 1.15 1.61E−03 1.28
Living in family homes or homes with special
service for children and young persons
−1.88E−03 −1.36 −7.96E−04 −0.55
Residential arrangements with special service for
adults
1.67E−03 2.77 2.50E−03 3.98
Short stay away from the home 1.75E−04 0.28 1.07E−03 1.64
Short period of supervision for schoolchildren aged
above 12
9.54E−05 0.11 1.12E−03 1.22
Individuals receiving any LSS measure per capita
age 0–64
−2.04E−01 −2.43 5.46E−01 6.25
Number of measures per capita age 0–64 1.54E−02 0.38 −8.34E−02 −1.99
§17-agreements of cost responsibility 5.10E−03 5.70 4.84E−03 5.18
§17-agreements of measure responsibility with
municipality
−4.23E−03 −2.69 −4.75E−03 −2.91
Municipal income variables
Grant-income SEK per capita 7.22E−06 2.51 8.57E−06 2.84
LSS-grant 1.35E−06 5.76 1.33E−06 5.44
Tax base per capita 1.78E−06 2.36 1.59E−06 2.01
Municipal characteristics variables
Population density. inv per km2 −1.84E−05 −1.43 −2.92E−05 −2.17
Population size (log), age 0–64 4.87E−02 3.04 7.13E−02 4.27
Log Likelihood 360.094 348.128
Nobs 288 288
The results for the dependent variable LSS expenditure per capita (0–64) are presented in the table for
comparison. Both these models are estimated using the GEOLAN matrix (neighbors that are geographical
neighbors within the same county council)
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in Table 7. However, as mentioned, the results are almost identical to the results for
the dependent variable LSS expenditure per capita (0–64) already presented.
Allsigniﬁcantestimatescontinuetobesigniﬁcantwiththesamesignwhenanalyzed
with the dependent variable LSS expenditure per individual receiving LSS services
excepttheestimatefortheexplanatoryvariable“IndividualswithLSSservices”(which
is the share of individuals with LSS services in a municipality). The estimate for this
variableisnownegativeandsigniﬁcant.However,thisisasexpected,sincethisvariable
captures the economics of scale of the LSS production. In this analysis, it can also
be evident that the effect of the §17-agreements between the municipalities further
indicates that the LSS production creates economics of scale. The municipalities with
§17 cost responsibility agreements have higher expenditures per individual receiving
LSSservices,andmunicipalitieswith§17-agreementsforperformingtheservicehave
a lower LSS expenditure per individual receiving LSS services.
Appendix C: Estimation results for the explanatory variables for county
council (dependent variable log LSS expenditure per capita)
The explanatory variables for the county councils are dummy variables. The dummy
variablestakesthevalue“one”ifthemunicipalitiesbelongtothesamecountycouncils,
otherwiseittakesthevalue“zero”.Asmentionedinthedatasection,thereare20county
councils in this study (the county council of Gotland is excluded).
Table 8 Estimation results: Explanatory variables for county council (dependent variable log LSSexp/cap
0–64)
Variable GEO GEOLAN FURa ALPHA
Estimate z value Estimate z value Estimate z value Estimate z value
County Councilsb
Uppsala −4.62E − 02 −1.34 −4.65E − 02 −1.35 −5.46E − 02 −1.56 −4.53E − 02 −1.32
Södermanland −4.48E − 02 −1.40 −4.70E − 02 −1.46 −5.68E − 02 −1.73 −4.72E − 02 −1.46
Östergötland −1.38E − 01 −3.84 −1.40E − 01 −3.87 −1.48E − 01 −4.06 −1.35E − 01 −3.78
Jönköping −1.20E − 01 −3.86 −1.22E − 01 −3.89 −1.31E − 01 −4.10 −1.20E − 01 −3.84
Kronoberg −6.02E − 02 −1.78 −6.23E − 02 −1.83 −6.93E − 02 −2.01 −6.23E − 02 −1.84
Kalmar −3.36E − 02 −1.00 −3.42E − 02 −1.02 −4.27E − 02 −1.22 −3.74E − 02 −1.11
Blekinge −1.78E − 02 −0.45 −1.74E − 02 −0.44 −2.54E − 02 −0.63 −1.90E − 02 −0.48
Skåne −1.41E − 01 −5.21 −1.41E − 01 −5.19 −1.50E − 01 −5.47 −1.37E − 01 −5.26
Halland −9.85E − 02 −2.65 −9.96E − 02 −2.67 −1.08E − 01 −2.85 −9.86E − 02 −2.64
Västra Götaland −5.38E − 02 −2.17 −5.40E − 02 −2.18 −6.16E − 02 −2.43 −5.50E − 02 −2.20
Värmland −6.29E − 02 −2.13 −6.46E − 02 −2.18 −7.14E − 02 −2.37 −6.44E − 02 −2.16
Örebro −6.84E − 02 −2.03 −6.88E − 02 −2.05 −7.65E − 02 −2.23 −6.97E − 02 −2.06
Västmanland −1.43E − 01 −4.19 −1.45E − 01 −4.20 −1.52E − 01 −4.40 −1.40E − 01 −4.13
Dalarna 7.50E − 03 0.25 8.56E − 03 0.29 9.08E − 04 0.03 6.03E − 03 0.20
Gävleborg 8.69E − 03 0.27 7.83E − 03 0.24 5.74E − 04 0.02 6.00E − 03 0.19
Västernorrland −6.71E − 02 −1.74 −6.83E − 02 −1.78 −8.60E − 02 −1.98 −7.44E − 02 −1.96
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Table 8 continued
Variable GEO GEOLAN FURa ALPHA
Estimate z value Estimate z value Estimate z value Estimate z value
Jämtland −6.07E − 02 −1.57 −6.11E − 02 −1.60 −6.77E − 02 −1.72 −6.72E − 02 −1.76
Västerbotten −1.03E − 01 −1.86 −1.04E − 01 −1.88 −1.12E − 01 −1.99 −1.09E − 01 −1.99
Norrbotten −7.19E − 02 −1.76 −7.25E − 02 −1.78 −7.98E − 02 −1.92 −7.82E − 02 −1.95
Log Likelihood 348.108 348.128 342.828 348.057
Nobs 288 288 284a 288
a For computational reasons, the municipalities of Norrtälje, Västervik, Sollefteå and Örnsköldsvik are
excluded from the analysis of the FUR neighborhood matrix, leaving 284 municipalities to be analyzed
(these municipalities have no neighbors as neighbor is deﬁned in the functional urban region neighborhood
matrix)
b The county of Stockholm is used as the reference county
From the estimates, it is evident that most of the county councils have signiﬁcantly
lower expenditure per capita than Stockholm county. Also, the estimates are similar
between the different neighborhood matrices.
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This empirical study takes advantage of a new intergovernmental grant in 
order to investigate the expenditure behavior of the municipalities in 
Sweden in two ways. First, the grant is used to study the effect on 
municipal spending related to the grant. Second, the grant is used to test a 
hypothesis of spatial interaction among municipalities due to mimicking 
behavior. The grant and expenditures studied here pertain to one specific 
service area of the Swedish municipalities; services to functionally 
impaired individuals. The grant was introduced in 2004. The data used 
pertains to the period before (2001-2003) and after (2004-2007) the 
introduction of the grant. A fixed-effects spatial lag model is used to study 
the (possible) spatial interactions among municipalities. Interestingly, the 
results show that during the first time period, the municipalities interact 
with their neighbors when setting the expenditure level, possibly due to 
mimicking. In the second time period, after the introduction of the grant, 
there is no evidence of interaction. This would support the hypothesis 
that the governmental grants provide information to the municipalities 
and the need for mimicking diminishes with the grant. 
 
Keywords: Local public expenditures, Intergovernmental grants, Spatial 
Interaction 
JEL classification: H72, H77, R12  
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1. Introduction  
The aim of this paper is to study the effect of a new intergovernmental 
grant distributed to Swedish municipalities. Two channels through which 
grants can affect public spending are hypothesized. First, similar to 
previous studies on intergovernmental grants, the effect of the grant on 
related public expenditure is studied. Second, and unlike other studies on 
intergovernmental grants, this study will also focus on the information 
and design of this particular grant and study if it makes municipalities 
change their level of interaction among each other.  
 
Studies on intergovernmental grants usually address the effects on local 
public expenditures of the grant. While economic theory predicts that an 
increase in unconditional grants to a local jurisdiction should have the 
same effect as an equivalent increase in income (Bradford and Oates, 1971 
a,b), empirical work on intergovernmental grants usually find that public 
spending from grants exceeds that from equivalent increases in income. 
This empirical phenomenon is labeled the flypaper effect since “money sticks 
where it hits”.1 There are several studies on federal grants and local public 
expenditures in the literature. In a study on American data, Knight (2002) 
incorporates the political determination of federal grants and the effects of 
these grants on state policies, and finds that federal highway grants 
decrease state highway spending. Swedish studies include Dahlberg, Mörk, 
Rattsö, Ågren (2007) who study the effect of federal grants on the 
behavior of lower level governments. They find evidence of federal grants 
being used to increase local spending, but not to reduce the local tax rate. 
1 Arthur Okun’s observation “money sticks where it hits” was named “flypaper effect” by 
Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld’s (1979).  2                              Intergovernmental Grants and Local Public Expenditures…  
On the other hand, Wikström (2007) finds that an intergovernmental 
grant toward public childcare did not affect the per-child expenditure, but 
it did affect the municipal tax rate. For surveys of the literature on 
intergovernmental grants, see e.g. Hines and Thaler (1995), and Oates 
(1999). 
 
There are reasons to believe that local governments, such as 
municipalities, are interdependent when making expenditure decisions, 
deciding on the tax policy, or setting welfare levels. The interaction arising 
from the interdependence among the municipalities could be due to, for 
example, mimicking, competition, or spillover among the municipalities. 
This interaction could also have a spatial dimension. For one thing, the 
decisions made by a local government can also have consequences for 
surrounding jurisdictions, not only the own jurisdiction.2 However, the 
spatial interaction must not necessarily be specific in a geographical 
context; other forms of closeness are also possible.3 One of the first 
papers of spatial interaction is the study by Case, Hines and Rosen (1993), 
where they use a spillover model to study the budget spillover among U.S. 
states. Their results indicate that a state’s government level of per capita 
expenditure is positively and significantly affected by the expenditure 
levels of its neighbors. Since the study by Case et al., there have been an 
increasing number of studies that include spatial interaction. For example, 
Dahlberg and Edmark (2008) find that there exists a “race-to-the-bottom” 
among neighboring municipalities regarding the welfare level; a 
                                                     
2 See e.g. Wilson (1999) for a review of the literature on tax competition and Brueckner 
(2003) for a description of the theoretical frameworks for strategic interaction among local 
governments. 
3 For example, spatial interaction could be modeled as political or economical closeness.  Intergovernmental Grants and Local Public Expenditures…                              3 
municipality’s welfare level is positively and significantly affected by the 
welfare level in neighboring municipalities. For other studies on welfare 
and tax competition, see e.g. Revelli (2005) and Allers and Elhorst (2005). 
In a study on local public expenditure in the Czech Republic, Stastna 
(2009) finds a positive spatial autocorrelation for expenditure on housing 
and culture, possibly due to mimicking; while negative spatial 
autocorrelation is found for the expenditure on industry, infrastructure 
and environmental protection, which is consistent with the spillover 
hypothesis. For other studies on spatial spillover, see e.g. Murdoch, 
Rahmatian and Thayer (1993), Hanes (2002), and Lundberg (2006). 
 
National governments sometimes impose new duties and responsibilities 
on local governments. One way of financing these new duties is by 
intergovernmental grants to the local governments. In this paper, one 
such intergovernmental grant is studied. This grant is associated with 
expenditures for one specific service area of the Swedish municipalities; 
services to functionally impaired individuals. The responsibility for these 
services, called LSS-services, was transferred to the municipalities in 1994 
via a government reform (LSS-act 1993:387).4,5 The LSS-act is an 
entitlement law that gives individuals with functional impairments the 
right to obtain support and services to obtain equal opportunities in living 
conditions and full participation in the community. Ever since the 
introduction of the LSS-act, there has been an increase in the expenditure 
for the services. The intergovernmental grant studied in this paper was 
4 The LSS-act stands for “The Act Concerning Support and Service for Persons with 
Certain Functional Impairments” (in Swedish: Lag om stöd och service till vissa funktionshindrade). 
5 See Birkelöf (2008) and for a more detailed description of the services to functional 
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introduced in 2004 as a response to the increased expenditure for the LSS 
services. In this paper, it is studied how the grant affects the local 
governments’ decisions with regard to LSS services. Is the grant used to 
increase spending on LSS services? If so, is the increase greater than a 
similar sized increase from other income, contrary to theory? In addition, 
is the intergovernmental grant associated with information to the 
municipalities? Here, it is hypothesized that the interaction among 
municipalities arises from mimicking and/or cooperation among the 
municipalities. The grant is based upon a nationally determined 
standardized cost, and since this information is transparent in the grant, 
these standardized costs could be used by the municipalities that seek 
information (at the expenditure/service level), rather than mimicking each 
other. In order to study the effect of this grant, two separate time periods 
are used. The first time period, 2001-2003, corresponds to the time before 
the introduction of the grant, and the second time period, 2004-2007, 
corresponds to the time period after the introduction of the grant. To 
support the hypothesis that, via the information on standardized costs, the 
intergovernmental grant decreases the need for information mimicking, 
the level of interaction among municipalities should decrease in the 
second time period.6  
 
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it adds to the public 
expenditure literature by analyzing the behavior of municipalities with 
regard to a new intergovernmental grant. The grant is directed toward an 
area that has experienced high increases in expenditure due to an earlier 
                                                     
6 It cannot be ruled out that earlier cooperation among municipalities also affects the level 
of interaction. However, as will be described later in this paper, the cooperation 
agreements were only applicable for two of the nine LSS services studied here.  Intergovernmental Grants and Local Public Expenditures…                              5 
governmental reform of this particular service area. Second, it adds to the 
spatial interaction literature by showing that spatial interaction could be 
due to lack of information and the municipalities thus mimicking in order 
to avoid information costs. Although this study pertains to expenditures 
in Sweden, it may still be of interest to other countries, especially since the 
social support system continues to develop throughout the world. With 
the increasing social support sector, as well as the growing elderly 
population, many countries are currently experiencing an increasing 
expenditure burden.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes 
institutional characteristics of the LSS-act and section 3 discusses theory 
and the empirical model. Section 4 describes the data and section 5 
presents the empirical findings, while concluding remarks can be found in 
section 6. 
 
2. Institutional Characteristics  
The Act Concerning Support and Service for Persons with Certain 
Functional Impairments (LSS) is an entitlement law to guarantee 
individuals with major and long-term functional disability equality in living 
conditions and full participation in the community.7 The responsibility for 
the LSS service provision largely resides with the municipalities that are 
responsible for nine of the ten LSS services; while the county council is 
7 The LSS-act contains provisions relating to measures for special support and special 
services for those with an intellectual disability, autism or a condition resembling autism; or 
for those with a significant and permanent intellectual impairment that occurred after brain 
damage in adulthood, or for those with other major and permanent physical or mental 
impairments not due to normal aging. 6                              Intergovernmental Grants and Local Public Expenditures…  
responsible for the remaining service.8 There has been a significant 
increase in the expenditures for LSS services over the years and there are 
also large differences among municipalities.9 To a great extent, this 
variation in expenditures can be explained by the nature of the LSS service 
production. While LSS naturally depends on the specific needs of the 
individuals and the number of services required, it also depends on the 
concentration of individuals with a need for LSS services in the 
municipalities. 
 
The expenditures on LSS services constitute a substantial10 part of the 
spending on services in the municipalities; however, the resources are 
limited and many of the municipalities have not fulfilled their obligations 
according to the LSS-act (The National Board of Health and Welfare, 
NBHW, 2005). Table 1 shows the total number of individuals with LSS 
services in Sweden, as well as the total number of LSS services provided 
(each individual can get more than one LSS service). As shown by Table 1, 
there has been a steady increase in both the number of individuals and the 
expenditure per person during the period 2001-2007. For example, during 
2001-2007, the number of individuals receiving LSS has increased by more 
                                                     
8 The ten services are: relief service in the home; children in residential homes; adults in 
residential homes; daily activity; personal contact; after school supervision; short stay away 
from home; companion service; personal assistance, and counseling and other personal 
support (which is the responsibility of the county councils).  
9 The expenditure studied in this paper only pertains to the nine services performed by the 
municipalities since they are the only ones included in the LSS expenditure equalization 
system. One of the LSS services, Personal Assistance, is the responsibility of the 
municipalities for the first twenty hours (per week). If a person’s needs call for more than 
twenty hours per week, this is a federal government (Social Service Administration) 
responsibility (as regulated in the LASS, Assistance Benefit Act).  
10 For example, the expenditures for LSS are 24-28 percent of the total expenditures for 
the whole “Elderly and Disabled” sector (calculated by using expenditures available at 
www.WebOr.se; provided by the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions).Intergovernmental Grants and Local Public Expenditures…                              7 
than 20 percent. For a more thorough review of the LSS-act and its 
development, see Birkelöf (2008) and Lewin, Westin and Lewin (2008). 
 
 
LSS Expenditure Equalization Grant 
The financing of municipalities’ LSS services has been subject to 
controversy ever since the LSS-act was implemented. For example, the 
Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR)11 believes 
that a federal financing of LSS services would be the best way of creating 
equal conditions for the municipalities as well as helping the municipalities 
operate a well functioning service. In 2000, the government appointed a 
group to investigate how to best equalize the expenditure for the LSS 
services among municipalities (SOU 2002:103). While the investigations 
took place, the government distributed a 350 million SEK grant to 
municipalities with extraordinarily high costs for their LSS services. 
Certain criteria had to be met to receive the grant; however, the grant 
itself was unconditional, meaning that there were no restrictions on how 
11 In Swedish: Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting (SKL). 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics, LSS characteristic.   




LSS services*  47330  48863  51662  52994  54360  54824  56880  20.2% 
Number of  
LSS Services 
granted* 





424300  414646  420680  424737  428720  447371  447388  5.5% 
*LSS services here only refer to the nine services performed by the municipalities. 
**Prices adjusted to 2001 year prices.  8                              Intergovernmental Grants and Local Public Expenditures…  
to spend it. The eligible municipalities, each year approximately 50 out of 
290, received the grant for the years 2001-2003.12. Then, in November 
2003, the government decided to implement the new expenditure 
equalization system for LSS expenditure starting in 2004.13 The purpose of 
the new grant was to equalize the cost for LSS services among 
municipalities via an intra-municipality system. 
 
The LSS expenditure equalization grant (LSS-EQ grant) is separate from the 
ordinary General grant system for income and cost equalization (where, for 
example, the structural cost difference for the mandatory services of 
municipality and county councils is accounted for). However, similar to 
the general grant and the temporary LSS grant (2001-2003), the LSS-EQ is 
also an unconditional grant. To determine the size of a municipality’s 
grant (or fee), the standardized cost for the municipality’s LSS service is 
calculated and compared to the calculated standardized cost of the whole 
country. The calculation of the standardized costs is transparent and to 
some extent publicly available (at Statistic Sweden’s website, www.scb.se). 
The standardized cost is calculated by multiplying the number of LSS 
services by a national average cost for each service. The cost is also 
adjusted by a concentration index and a personnel cost index. The purpose of the 
concentration index is to reduce/compensate for economies of scale. The 
purpose of the personnel cost index is to adjust for differences in the 
                                                     
12 Each year, the municipalities had to meet the criteria (i.e. the expenditure had to be at a 
certain level). Most of the municipalities that received the grant one year also received it 
for the two other years, although there were some municipalities that received it only once 
or twice. 
13 The decisions were based on the Legislative Proposal 2002/03:151 “Equalization of 
certain costs for special support to individuals with functional impairments” (In Swedish: 
Utjämning av vissa kostnader för stöd och service till funktionshindrade), and from a federal report 
"Equalization of costs for LSS” (In Swedish: Utjämning av LSS-kostnader), SOU 2002:103.Intergovernmental Grants and Local Public Expenditures…                              9 
requirement of support (some LSS services require more personnel than 
others). Then, finally, the standardized cost is adjusted by Net Price Index. 
Unlike the temporary grant of 2001-2003, the size of the LSS-EQ grant is 
known to the municipalities in advance. For a more thorough review of 
how the LSS-EQ grant is calculated, see Appendix A.  
 
Table 2. Standardized Cost* for municipalities and the nation.  
                Calculated Standardized Cost for Municipalities  National 
Year  Mean  Std.Dev  Min  Max  Mean 
2004  2334 (2544)  684 (817)  564 (357)  4841 (5775)  2293 
2005  2582 (2659)  806 (839)  487 (501)  5858 (6262)  2546 
2006  2713 (2841)  769 (877)  814 (607)  5137 (6132)  2681 
*The values are shown in SEK per capita, adjusted to 2001 year prices.  
Note: the values within parenthesis are the actual expenditures for LSS as 
reported by the municipalities. 
 
The standardized cost, per capita, is computed for every municipality and 
for the whole nation. If a municipality’s calculated standardized cost is 
higher than the national standardized cost, the municipality receives a 
grant. On the other hand, if a municipality’s standardized cost is lower 
than the national standardized cost, the municipality must pay a fee.14 The 
grant (or fee) that a municipality is to receive (pay) is multiplied by the 
population of the municipality. For comparison, Table 2 shows the 
calculated standardized cost for the municipalities and the country’s 
standardized cost. The municipalities’ actual expenditures for the LSS 
services are shown within parentheses. Between 2004 and 2008, certain 
transition rules consisting of a maximum fee and a maximum grant apply. 
During the transition period, the difference between the total grant and 
14 The equalization system is regulated in two laws; the law of equalization-fees (SFS 
2003:886) and the law of equalization-grants (SFS 2003:887).10                              Intergovernmental Grants and Local Public Expenditures…  
the total fee (from all municipalities) is financed by the federal 
government. Therefore, the equalization system will not be fully 
implemented until the year 2009.  
 
Cooperation/agreements among municipalities  
The municipalities are responsible for providing LSS services to their 
citizens. However, if a municipality is not able to provide the service itself, 
then (as regulated by §17 in the LSS-act) cooperation among 
municipalities is possible for two of the LSS services: children in residential 
homes and adults in residential homes. Municipalities can enter into agreements 
with one another where one municipality retains the cost responsibility for 
its residents living in special residential homes in another municipality, 
while the other municipality provides the services. The §17-agreements are 
used by, for example, small municipalities which do not have the ability to 
provide the service themselves. Municipalities entering into §17 
agreements get a lower LSS expenditure per capita than they otherwise 
would (Birkelöf, 2008). However, due to the introduction of the LSS 
expenditure equalization grant in 2004, many municipalities have canceled 
the §17-agreements. The individuals living in the residential homes are 
now registered citizens of the municipalities where the residential homes 
are located, and their costs are instead included in the expenditure 
equalization system. 
 
  Intergovernmental Grants and Local Public Expenditures…                              11 
3. Theoretical Framework and Empirical Strategy 
This section will start with a brief discussion on the theory of 
intergovernmental grants and the theoretical backgrounds of the different 
fiscal interaction models. This is followed by a discussion of how the LSS 
expenditure equalization grant and the (possible) fiscal interaction with regard 
to services for functionally impaired are linked. 
 
Theoretical Background 
Theory of Intergovernmental grants 
In the theory of intergovernmental grants and the basic median voter 
model, the source of income is of no importance for the local 
government. Therefore, grants and local income have similar effects on 
local spending as long as the grants are given lump-sum (Bradford and 
Oates, 1971 a,b). Grants to the local government should be treated as any 
other income, i.e. they should be allocated according to the income 
elasticities of the median voter. However, contrary to theory, the empirical 
literature on public expenditures usually finds that public spending is 
increased more by (lump-sum) grants than by local income. This is the so-
called flypaper effect, since “money sticks where it hits”. For surveys of 
the literature on intergovernmental grants, see e.g. Hines and Thaler 
(1995) and Oates (1999). 
 
There are two groups of intergovernmental grants: unconditional grants 
and conditional grants. Unconditional grants are free to be spent in any 
way, and the way in which they are usually designed implies that income 
from unconditional grants should have the same impact on local spending 
as the same size increase in local residents’ income. Conditional grants, on 12                              Intergovernmental Grants and Local Public Expenditures…  
the other hand, are grants given for specific purposes; for example, the 
national government can use these to compensate the local government 
for carrying out a specific program. Their use is normally restricted; the 
money cannot be spent on other expenditure programs or be used to cut 
taxes. In addition to the two groups of grants, there is also a second 
dimension to the grants; they can either be matching or non-matching 
grants. Non-matching grants are often used to increase equality among 
jurisdictions, in terms of income/spending. Matching grants are designed 
as price subsidies; these grants have an income effect as well as a 
substitution effect. The grant decreases the relative price of the 
service/expenditure. Therefore, matching grants should have a flypaper 
effect since they affect the slope of the budget line, while non-matching 
grants only have an income effect and should not have a flypaper effect. 
However, studies of non-matching grants usually find a flypaper effect; 
contrary to theory. For an extensive review of intergovernmental 
transfers; see Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers: Principles and Practice Boadway 
and Shah (eds.) (2007). Both the temporary LSS grant and the permanent 
LSS expenditure equalization grant studied in this paper are unconditional 
non-matching grants. Although designed for a specific purpose, there is 
no restriction on how municipalities spend them. Since there are no 
restrictions, the effect of the grants can be in the form of higher quality on 
the services for LSS (due to increased spending on LSS services); lower 
tax rates in the municipalities; or increased spending on other municipality 
services. Naturally, a mixture of these three outcomes is also possible.  
 
Theory of Fiscal Interaction 
There are several reasons to believe that local jurisdictions, such as 
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expenditure decisions. One reason why municipalities are interdependent 
is that the benefits of public spending in one jurisdiction can spill over to 
neighboring jurisdictions. The interdependence among local governments 
could then cause a strategic interaction among jurisdictions. For example, 
infrastructure, environmental protection, and parks in one jurisdiction can 
increase the welfare of residents in a neighboring jurisdiction. The 
neighboring jurisdiction can then “free-ride” and decrease its own 
spending on these services. In this sense, public expenditure from one 
jurisdiction enters the welfare function of other jurisdictions, directly 
affecting the jurisdiction. Local jurisdictions can also be indirectly affected by 
the fiscal policies of other jurisdictions (Brueckner, 2003). In order to 
attract a mobile tax base, a local jurisdiction can compete with lower tax 
rates as compared to nearby jurisdictions. This is due to the idea that 
individuals “vote with their feet” and move to a community that provides 
the desired level of a public good/tax rate.15 Interaction of this type can 
also be applied to welfare benefits. However, here the jurisdictions 
compete with low levels of welfare benefits in order not to attract welfare 
recipients (Brueckner 2000). This is the so-called race-to-the-bottom 
behavior.  
The interdependence among local governments could also arise from 
yardstick competition (performance comparison). The interaction comes 
from the existence of an informational externality among neighboring 
jurisdictions due to imperfect information, and the cost of obtaining 
information (Besley and Case, 1995). Imperfectly informed voters can use 
the performance of other jurisdictions as a yardstick when evaluating their 
15 This is the so-called “Tibeout migration” where migration to other regions is motivated 
by fiscal gains. This argument was originally presented by Tiebout (1956).14                              Intergovernmental Grants and Local Public Expenditures…  
own politicians’ performance. In their study, Besley and Case conclude 
that politicians in office need to look at other local politicians and their 
decision making before making their own decisions (to avoid the risk of 
not being reelected). The yardstick model can also be applied to local 
governments themselves, i.e. local governments can also be incompletely 
informed. The yardstick model is commonly used for comparison of 
performance among local governments, so-called benchmarking. A local 
government can – when deciding on the best policy or expenditure level – 
use nearby jurisdictions as a yardstick/benchmark and mimic their policy 
or expenditure level in order to avoid an information cost associated with 
obtaining the information themselves. Yardstick competition could be 
used to study local governments’ decision making, for example, what 
service level to provide. For a survey of the empirical literature on 
strategic and fiscal interaction, see Brueckner (2003) and Revelli (2005). 
 
LSS-EQ Grant and Fiscal Interaction  
The hypothesis in this paper is that municipalities interact with one 
another when setting their LSS expenditure level. Since LSS services 
constitute a type of social service provisions, the expected source of fiscal 
interaction might be consistent with the theory of fiscal competition, in 
particular race-to-the-bottom. However, in this paper, it is argued that the 
source of interaction among nearby municipalities is due to lack of 
information on the municipalities’ side. Therefore, the source of fiscal 
interaction in municipalities comes from the yardstick model, in particular 
mimicking. As previously mentioned, the LSS-act is an entitlement law, 
which gives eligible individuals the right to obtain services in accordance 
with the act. Since it is an entitlement law, the usual goals of the local 
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example). There are at least three reasons why the yardstick model is the 
most likely source of interaction in the present case. First, the LSS service 
provision became the responsibility of the municipalities via a reform in 
1994 and the entire new LSS-act was implemented at the same time. The 
LSS-act extended the number of people eligible to receive services, as well 
as the number of services offered (as compared to when the county 
council was responsible for providing the service). Only general guidelines 
for the provision of LSS services were provided for the municipalities and 
therefore, the uncertainty was great. Thus, in order to get information, 
while minimizing the information costs, the municipalities may mimic 
each other in their effort to provide the service. Second, only about 0.5 
percent of the population receives services according to the LSS-act and, 
as a group, they are not very mobile. Furthermore, many of individuals 
who receive LSS services are dependent on having friends and family 
nearby, thus making them even less mobile. Third, one of the reasons for 
the LSS reform (the transfer of responsibility from the county level to the 
municipality level) was the aim of not having any differences in the 
provision due to geographical location. Since there are still differences 
among municipalities, this may point to a lack of information on what the 
service level should be rather than believing that some municipalities 
deliberately set their own LSS service/expenditure level below that of 
others.  
With regard to the theory of intergovernmental grants, the LSS-EQ grant 
is known to the municipalities in advance and, as mentioned, the grant is 
an unconditional non-matching grant. The municipalities will therefore 
take the LSS-EQ grant into account when allocating their budget for the 
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more than a similar increase in income, it would be consistent with the 
flypaper effect; i.e. intergovernmental grants increase local expenditures. 
The temporary grant, on the contrary, was associated with great insecurity, 
and it is likely that the municipalities would not expect or include it when 
budgeting their LSS service provision for the coming year. If that is true, 
then municipalities receiving the (unconditional) temporary grant would 
view this as any other income, i.e. they would not increase (or decrease) 
their spending on LSS services as a result of an increase in the grant. 
 
Empirical Model 
Spatial interaction among governments arises when the spending decision 
in one jurisdiction does not only depend on its own characteristics but 
also on the level of spending by other jurisdictions. The dependence could 
either be directly, such as in the spillover model, or indirectly, as in the 
tax- or yardstick competition models. Spatial interaction can be modeled 
either in the spatial lag model or the spatial error model. In the spatial lag 
model, the interaction is specified by including a spatially lagged 
dependent variable; in the spatial error model, the spatial dependence is in 
the error term.16 When spatial dependence is due to strategic interaction, it 
is theoretically consistent with including a spatially lagged dependent 
variable in the model. Since the hypothesis in this paper is that the 
municipalities mimic/interact with nearby municipalities, spatial 
interaction will be modeled according to the lag model.17  
 
                                                     
16 In the spatial error model, the dependence could be due to omitted variables or shocks 
that are spatially dependent themselves. 
17 However, in the results section, a Lagrange Multiplier test is presented to discriminate 
between the two models. The LM tests points toward the spatial lag model being the 
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In general, the spatial lag model can be specified as (in matrix form) 
 
      X WY Y       (1)
 
where Y is a vector of spending, W is a weight matrix that describes the 
neighborhood relationship, X is a matrix of explanatory variables for the 
jurisdictions, ε is a vector of errors; and δ and vector β are parameters to 
be estimated, where δ is the spatial interaction parameter. One major issue 
in the estimation of the spatial lag model is the endogeneity of Y. Since Y 
appears on both sides of the equation, multidirectional dependence 
between the dependent variables exists, and errors for one observation are 
likely to be related to the errors in neighboring observations, i.e. spatial 
dependence (Anselin, 1988). The resulting correlation means that ordinary 
least squares (OLS) estimates of the parameters of the equation are biased 
and inconsistent. This requires the use of alternative methods for 
estimating the model; either by using instrument variables (IV) or using 
maximum likelihood (ML) estimator. 
 
In this paper, panel data is used in order to study the effects of the LSS 
intergovernmental grants during different time periods. Panel data will 
generally be more informative, with more variation and less collinearity 
among variables (Elhorst, 2003). Panel data also allows for the 
specification of more complicated behavioral hypotheses including effects 
that cannot be addressed using pure cross-sectional or time-series data 
(Hsiao 1986, Baltagi 2001). The traditional fixed effects model has been 
extended to include a spatial lag dependence specification18 (Anselin and 
18 The traditional fixed effects model has also been extended to include a spatial error 
specification; see Anselin and Hudak (1992).18                              Intergovernmental Grants and Local Public Expenditures…  
Hudak, 1992). Following Elhorst (2003), the spatial lag model extended to 
include fixed effects for space and time can be specified as:  
 
  , it it i it it it X WY Y              (2)
 
where i = 1,.., N is for spatial units (municipalities), and t = 1,…, T is for 
time dimension.  is the spatial interaction parameter to be estimated;  i   
and  it  are the variable intercept treated as fixed, representing the effect of 
the omitted variables that are unique for each municipality and year. The 
weight matrix, W, describes the relationship between the neighboring 
units, ωij 19. To estimate the model, the weight matrix W must be defined 
in advance. In the literature, it is common to define neighbors based on 
geographical contiguity or distance.20 The hypothesis in this paper, with 
regard to spatial interaction, is that nearby municipalities mimic and 
interacts with one another in order to obtain information (on the 
expenditure level for LSS). To not only include the closest neighbor, the 
neighborhood weight matrix is based on a second-order binary contiguity 
matrix for Swedish municipalities.21 Both a municipality’s neighbor and its 
neighbor’s neighbor are considered to be neighbors in the second-order 
contiguity matrix. If the spatial interaction parameter is significantly 
different from zero, the hypothesis of no spatial interaction can be 
                                                     
19 ωij takes the value of one if municipalities i and j are neighbors, and zero otherwise. The 
diagonal in W (the municipality’s own spending: ω ii) is always zero. Furthermore, the 
weight-matrix is row standardized, so that each row sums to one.
20 Other definitions are also possible, such as political or economic closeness.
21 Other definitions of neighbors are also possible. For example, “neighbors” could be 
based on the size of the municipalities or defined as commuting regions. In Birkelöf 
(2008), a set of different neighborhood matrixes was tested with regard to expenditures for 
LSS services, and the interaction among municipalities seems to be in geographically close 
municipalities. 
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rejected and it can be interpreted as an indication of the neighboring 
municipalities interacting with each other.  
 
To get consistent estimates for the   coefficients, the use of demeaned 
spatial regression may be appropriate (Anselin, Le Gallo, and Jayet 2008, 
Elhorst 2003).22 The demeaned equation is obtained by subtracting the 
average for each cross-sectional unit computed over the time dimension – 
which eliminates the individual fixed effects as well as the constant term 
(Anselin et al. 2008).23 To address the endogeneity issue of Y, the model 
will be estimated using maximum likelihood method.24 
 
To study the hypothesis of interaction due to information spillover, the 
data in this study is divided into two data sets in order to study the effect 
of the LSS expenditure equalization grant, implemented in 2004. The 
hypothesis is that the spatial interaction parameter in the two time periods 
differs from one another due to the LSS-EQ grant. Both the temporary 
LSS grant and the permanent LSS expenditure equalization grant are included 
in this study; the temporary grant is included in the first time period, while 
the permanent grant is included in the second time period. The temporary 
22 In Elhorst models, the log-likelihood uses σ2I as the error variance, not σ2QNT (in Anselin 
et al. 2008, p 641). 
23 The dependent and explanatory variables for every spatial unit (municipality) are taken in 
deviations of their average over time. For example, the dependent variable is defined as 












  where  
24All computations are performed using the standard Matlab software packages (v.7.0) plus 
the freely available spatial panel routine toolbox downloaded from James P. LeSage’s 
website at www.spatial-econometrics.com. Furthermore, the code for fixed effect spatial 
panel models is downloadable from the J.P Elhorst website at 
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grant is not expected to have any effect on the dependent variable LSS 
expenditure or affect the level of mimicking. That is, municipalities are still 
expected to mimic each other since this grant did not provide any 
information; i.e. the spatial interaction coefficient is expected to be 
positive. The LSS-EQ grant, on the other hand, is expected to affect both 
the dependent variable and the lag parameter. If the LSS-EQ grant 
provides the municipalities with information about the expenditure level, 
as is the hypothesis, the need to mimic its neighbors should decrease or 
diminish; therefore, the coefficient should not differ from zero. In the 
second period, municipalities are expected to use part of the grant to 
increase their expenditures for LSS services since the grant is known to 
the municipalities in advance. 
 
4. Data 
This study uses a seven year panel data set for Swedish municipalities, 
divided into two datasets; 2001-2003 and 2004-2007. There are 290 
municipalities and 21 county councils in Sweden. All municipalities except 
one, Gotland, are included in the analysis. Gotland is excluded because 
the municipality and the county council coincide and therefore have a 
different role than the other municipalities. All the data in this study is 
collected from Statistics Sweden (SCB), except the LSS service variables 
that are collected from the National Board of Health and Welfare 
(NBHW). Descriptive statistics – including mean, minimum and 
maximum values – for all variables are presented in Table 3 and Table 4, 
for the years 2001-2003 and 2004-2007, respectively. 
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Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in this study is LSS expenditure per capita (measured 
in SEK). All monetary variables in this study are adjusted to 2001 SEK 
using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from Statistics Sweden. The 
dependent variable is chosen to study the effect of the grants on the LSS 
expenditure, but it is also chosen to reflect changes in quality of the LSS 
service (for example, increased expenditure may be a sign of higher 
spending on personnel).  
 
Explanatory variables  
In addition to the explanatory variables for the two LSS grants, 
explanatory variables for the different LSS services are also included in the 
analysis. The LSS expenditure per capita consists of the expenditures from all 
nine LSS services. However, the nine services are not equally cost 
intensive. To control for this, there are two alternative ways of measuring 
the impact of the different services on the expenditures. One way is to 
construct an index of how cost intensive each service is. Another way is to 
use the number of individuals that is granted each service in the analysis. 
Since the expenditures for the services are not reported individually, it is 
not possible to construct an index. Instead, to account for the differences 
in cost-intensity, the second option is used.25 Specifically, the LSS services 
variables are reported as “the number of individuals in a municipality with 
LSS service (daily activity for example), as a share of all individuals 
receiving any LSS service in that municipality”.  
25 Seven of the LSS services provided by the municipalities are included as explanatory 
variables in this study. The two services that are excluded, children living in residential 
homes and relief service in the home are only granted to a few individuals and thus, there 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics 2001-2003. 
Variable                                                         Mean       Std.Dev       Min        Max  
LSS expenditure, per capita, SEK   2380  809  432  6080 
LSS temporary grant, per capita, SEK  53  156  0  1380 
Tax base, per capita, SEK  113094  15782  87300  240300 
General Grant, per capita, SEK  8060  4773  -15052  22699 
Population (log)  4.26  0.39  3.41  5.88 
Share of population age 75+, percent  9.74  2.25  3.21  15.45 
Share of population age 7-16, percent  13.95  1.24  7.99  17.61 
LSS service variable*:         
   - Daily activity  44.11  11.87  0  88.00 
   - Personal Assistance  10.60  10.10  0  80.00 
   - Companion Service  17.16  12.24  0  61.33 
   - Personal Contact  30.37  13.23  0  73.68 
   - Short stay away from home  20.74  8.76  0  54.55 
   - After school supervision  6.93  5.28  0  35.00 
   - Adults in residential home  34.90  12.15  0  72.37 
Individuals with LSS services per  
10000 inhabitants (0-64) 
57.69 17.40  10.14  150.31 
*the share of the individuals in a municipality with (a specific) LSS service  
  of all individuals receiving any LSS service in that municipality. 
 
For example, from Table 3, 44 percent of those who receive any LSS 
service receive the service Daily activity. This makes it the most common 
service. The service Adults in residential homes is the most expensive service 
and about 35 percent receive this. In a comparison between the two time 
periods, we can see that the percentage distribution of the share of 
individuals with each service is similar. However, the number of 
individuals receiving LSS services has increased from 57 to 63 (per 10000 
inhabitants). Moreover, the average LSS expenditure per capita has 
increased over the two time periods, from 2380 to 2720 SEK. 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics 2004-2007. 
Variable                                                 Mean         Std.Dev    Min        Max 
LSS expenditure, per capita, SEK   2720  854  363  6769 
LSS-EQ grant, per capita, SEK  71  675  -1150  3407 
Tax base, per capita, SEK  128004  15652  101200  245400 
General Grant, per capita, SEK  7112  4657  -14367  22267 
Population (log)  4.26  0.40  3.41  5.90 
Share of population age 75+, percent  9.84  2.23  3.43  16.17 
Share of population age 7-16, percent  12.90  1.27  7.11  17.23 
LSS service variable*:         
   - Daily activity  45.27  11.12  0  85.19 
   - Personal Assistance  7.96  7.22  0  51.94 
   - Companion Service  17.81  11.94  0  67.54 
   - Personal Contact  32.48  13.13  0  78.95 
   - Short stay away from home  19.50  8.25  0  54.55 
   - After school supervision  8.35  5.11  0  33.33 
   - Adults in residential home  34.96  11.45  0  64.47 
Individuals with LSS services per 10000 
inhabitants (0-64)  62.89 17.05  15.41  160.46 
*the share of the individuals in a municipality with (a specific) LSS service of all 
individuals receiving any LSS service in that municipality.  
 
Along with the two LSS grant variables, General grant is also included in the 
analysis. As mentioned in the theoretical discussion in section 3.1, in the 
basic median voter model of public finance, grant revenue is treated as any 
other income. However, contrary to theory, the empirical literature often 
finds that local public expenditures increase more with grants from the 
central government than with an equivalent increase in private income. To 
verify if the flypaper effect is evident here, the effect on LSS expenditure 
of an increase in LSS-EQ grant and the effect on LSS expenditure of an 
increase in General grants should be greater than the effect on LSS 
expenditure of revenue steaming from an increase in the Tax base. 
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Additional explanatory variables are used to control for municipal 
characteristics that may affect the composition of expenditures in 
different municipalities. The age structure is measured by the share of the 
population aged 75 or older and the share of the population between the ages 7-16. 
These two variables are used in order to account for municipalities with a 
high share of elderly people or individuals of school age. Since the LSS-
EQ grant is unconditional, if a municipality has a high share of elderly 
people, for example, the municipality may choose to spend the grant on 
elderly care. Finally, the natural logarithm of the total population is also 
included as a variable to control for population size effects on LSS 
expenditure.  
 
Merged data and missing observations
In 2003, the municipality of Uppsala was split into two municipalities, 
Uppsala and Knivsta. In this analysis, these two municipalities are added 
together for the years 2004-2007 (values weighted by population). The 
data for the LSS service variables is available as the number of individuals 
granted each LSS service. As mentioned in section 2, the service Personal 
assistance is regulated by both the LSS-act (up to twenty hours per week) 
and the LASS-act (for more than twenty hours per week). Prior to 2004, 
many municipalities over-reported the number of individuals with Personal 
assistance; they also included individuals with services granted by the LASS-
act (which is the responsibility of the Social Service Administration). This 
was clarified in 2004, causing the reported number of individuals with 
Personal assistance to decrease to a more correct value (NBHW, 2005). Due 
to the sensitive nature of the LSS data, values for municipalities that only 
have one, two, or three individuals with a particular LSS service are not 
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Nine municipalities26 have missing values for the LSS expenditure per capita 
variable for the year 2001. Instead, the values for 2002 are used. The 
municipalities Härjedalen and Simrishamn have missing values for LSS 
expenditure per capita for the year 2002. Here, the mean values of 2001 and 
2003 are used.  
 
5. Empirical Findings 
In this section, the results for the model discussed in section 3 are 
presented. As previously mentioned, the data is divided into two separate 
periods, 2001-2003 and 2004-2007, in order to study the effect of the 
temporary and permanent LSS grants. The determinants of LSS 
expenditure per capita are first estimated with Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) and then with the Spatial Lag Model (SAR), including municipality-
specific and time-specific fixed effects.27 The results are presented in 
Table 5.  
 
The spatial lag model is theoretically consistent with spatial interaction 
among municipalities studied in this paper; even so, we must test to decide 
which spatial model to use: the spatial error model or the spatial lag 
model. In the search for the right specification, “the classical approach” is 
26 The nine municipalities are: Bollebygd, Finspång, Gislaved, Herrljunga, Svedala, 
Svenljunga, Torsby, Varberg, and Vindeln.
27 In addition, three other specifications of the models were tested. One specification did 
not include any fixed effects; another specification included fixed effects for time only. 
However, both these specifications were outperformed by the specification presented in 
this paper. The third specification included fixed effects for municipalities only; since it is 
important to include time trends in this study, the model with fixed effects for both 
municipalities and time was chosen. The results from the above specifications can be 
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used.28 First, an OLS model is estimated. Then, a hypothesis of no spatial 
dependence is tested using a Lagrange Multiplier test (denoted LM test). 
Anselin et al. (1996) have developed an LM test to test for spatial 
dependence in the dependent variable or the error term for cross- 
sectional settings. Recently, Anselin et al. (2008) also specified the LM 
tests for spatial panels.29 The LM test statistic is used to test the null 
hypothesis that the spatial dependence parameter is equal to zero. A 
rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that there is spatial dependence 
among neighboring regions, due to, for example, mimicking. If the 
hypothesis of no spatial dependence is rejected, then the LM tests are 
used to select between the lag and the error model. If the LM tests for 
both specifications are significant, the one with the highest test statistic is 
chosen (since the one with the higher value must be at least as good as the 
other).  
 
As can be seen in Table 5, for the first period, the LM test statistic is 
significant for both the spatial error and the spatial lag model. Since the 
LM test statistic is slightly higher for the spatial lag model, it indicates that 
the spatial lag model is the appropriate model to use here. This is also 
consistent with both theory and earlier empirical studies on spatial 
interaction among governments. For the second time period, however, the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected, i.e. there is no evidence of spatial 
                                                     
28 For testing and discriminating between the spatial lag and the spatial error specification, 
see e.g. Anselin, Bera, Florax and Yoon (1996), Florax and Folmer (1992), and Florax, 
Folmer and Rey (2003). 
29 If significant spatial autocorrelation for both the spatial error and the spatial lag models 
occurs, a robust version of the LM test is used to select between the two models. This 
latter LM test is robust for non-normality of the error terms (Anselin et al., 1996). The 
robust version tests if the spatial dependence is in the error term, controlling for spatial lag 
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interaction among municipalities. Therefore, OLS is preferred over the 
spatial lag model for the years 2004-2007. Finally, a Hausman test is 
performed to discriminate between a random effects model and a fixed 
effects model, and the test strongly indicates that the fixed effects model 
outperforms the random effects model. Therefore, fixed effects for a 
region (municipality) and time (year) are included in the regression.  
 
Regression results 
Interestingly, the results from the regressions, shown in Table 5, support 
the hypothesis that municipalities mimic each other before the 
introduction of the LSS-EQ grant. In the first time period, there is 
evidence of spatial interaction among neighboring municipalities, which 
could be due to mimicking. The spatial lag coefficient of 0.13 can be 
interpreted as for every 100 SEK increase in neighbors’ spending of LSS, 
a municipality increases its own spending on LSS with 13 SEK. In the 
second time period, in contrast, there is no longer any evidence of spatial 
interaction among neighboring municipalities. This result supports the 
hypothesis that the transparency of the national set standardized cost level 
decreases the interaction (mimicking) among municipalities. In fact, since 
the “standardized cost” for each LSS service is provided with the LSS-EQ 
grant, this may be sufficient information for the municipalities to use in 
order to decide on the LSS service/expenditure level.  
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Table 5. Estimation results for 2001-2003 and 2004-2007. 
  2001-2003  2004-2007 
  I - OLS  II - SAR  III - OLS  IV - SAR 
Variable                                  Estim.      t-stat    Estim.      t-stat*    Estim.       t-stat       Estim.      t-stat* 
Spatial Lag Coefficient      0.13  1.68      0.08  1.11 
LSS-EQ Grant, SEK          0.086  3.99  0.086  4.01 
LSS temporary Grant, SEK  0.058  0.70  0.056  0.67         
General Grant, SEK   -0.029  -1.02  -0.027  -0.94  0.021  1.11  0.021  1.17 
Tax base, SEK  -0.002  -0.30  -0.002  -0.28  -0.0002  -0.03  -0.0001  -0.08 
Population (log)  312.86  0.19  420.06  0.25  -1479.8  -1.28  -1470.5  -1.28 
Share population age 7-16  -48.08  -1.11  -47.52  -1.11  -39.76  -1.28  -41.04  -1.33 
Share population age 75+   -57.83  -1.06  -64.34  -1.2  -144.35  -3.76  -144.58  -3.79 
Individuals with LSS  
services per  10000 inhabitants  1.05  0.72  1.00  0.69  9.94  6.61  9.96  6.68 
Daily activity  -1.56  -1.06  -1.5  -1.03  -2.35  -1.54  -2.35  -1.55 
Personal Assistance  3.81  2.89  3.85  2.95  0.22  0.12  0.27  0.15 
Companion Service  4.41  2.75  4.47  2.82  2.71  1.88  2.59  1.81 
Personal Contact  -0.87  -0.62  -0.78  -0.56  -0.48  -0.39  -0.51  -0.42 
Short stay away from 
home  3.31  2.01  3.27  2.01  -0.49  -0.29  -0.53  -0.31 
After school supervision  3.00  1.24  2.95  1.23  2.16  0.94  2.25  0.99 
Adults in residential home  2.78  1.46  2.74  1.45  4.2  2.25  4.24  2.29 
Log-likelihood      -5611.12      -7491.51   
R-squared    0.0337        0.0737       
Number of Observations  864    864    1152    1152   
Spatial fixed effect  yes    yes    yes    yes   
Time period fixed effect  yes    yes    yes    yes   
Hausman test FE vs. RE  87.65  0.00      64.02  0.00     
LM (lag)      3.18  0.07      1.56  0.21 
Robust LM (lag)      0.10  0.75      0.77  0.38 
LM (error)      3.09  0.08      2.13  0.15 
Robust LM (error)        0.01  0.91        1.33  0.25 
*Note: for the spatial lag model, these are asymptotic t-statistics.       
 
 
  Intergovernmental Grants and Local Public Expenditures…                              29 
To study if there are differences in how the temporary LSS grant (2001-
2003) and the permanent LSS expenditure equalization grant (2004-2007) 
affect LSS expenditure per capita, the data is divided into two different 
periods corresponding to each time period. The results imply that the two 
grants do not have the same effect. Specifically, during the first period, the 
temporary grant did not affect the LSS expenditure at all. This is just as 
expected, since the way in which the temporary grant was distributed can 
be viewed as a way of compensating the municipalities after the cost has 
occurred. However, the interpretation of this effect could be problematic 
since the LSS grant may be endogenous here (those who received the 
grant are those municipalities with high expenditures). The permanent 
grant distributed during the second period, on the other hand, has a 
positive effect on the LSS expenditures. For every 100 SEK received in 
LSS-EQ grant, municipalities use 9 SEK to increase the LSS expenditures. 
This effect of the grant is consistent with the hypothesis that the grant 
increases local public expenditures. The result is plausible since the grant 
is known to the municipalities; they know how much they will receive 
(pay) in grant (fee) for the current year and, therefore, they can take this 
into account when setting their LSS service level.  
 
With regard to the municipality variables for the general grant and tax 
base, neither shows significant coefficients for either time period. An 
increase in either the general grant or the tax base does not increase the 
spending on LSS services. This also means that there is no evidence of a 
flypaper effect with regard to the general grant and tax base variables. 
Nevertheless, since the LSS-EQ grant has a positive effect on LSS 
expenditure, while the tax base does not have any effect, it could be 
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only nine percent of the LSS-EQ grant go toward the LSS service, the 
flypaper effect is not particularly strong here.30 The flypaper effect found 
here is not strong compared to other studies either. Hines and Thaler 
(1995) list ten commonly cited studies that include the flypaper effect; all 
of which show some degree of flypaper effect: the flypaper effect in these 
studies ranges from 0.25 to 1.00 (as compared to the 0.09 found in this 
study). 
 
When studying the other control variables, one major difference between 
the two time periods is that while the share of elderly people in a 
municipality does not have any effect on the LSS expenditure in the first 
period, it has a negative effect in the second period. This could be 
interpreted as  the LSS expenditure increasing when the share of elderly 
decreases in a municipality; which could be due to a redistribution of the 
budget allocation within the elderly and disabled sector, of which both 
services to the elderly and the functionally impaired are part. The 
estimates for the LSS service Personal assistance also differ greatly between 
the two periods. The reason for this is most likely that the municipalities 
over-reported the number of individuals with personal assistance during 
the first period, while it is corrected from 2004 and onwards. Another 
coefficient that differs greatly between the two time periods is the LSS 
service  Adults in residential home. As mentioned in the data description 
section, this is a service that is very cost intensive. While the coefficient is 
not significant in the first period, it is both greater and significant in the 
second period. The reason for this is most likely that the municipalities, 
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General Grant), the α parameter is significant, while the β parameter is non-significant, 
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from the year 2004, no longer use §17 agreements of cost responsibility 
between municipalities. The use of §17 agreements helped the 
municipalities achieve economies of scale; however, after the 
implementation of the LSS-EQ grant in 2004, the agreements are no 
longer in use, therefore both “receiving” and the “transmitting” 
municipalities get a higher LSS expenditure per capita. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, the effect of a new intergovernmental grant, introduced in 
2004, with regard to the expenditure behavior of the municipalities, was 
studied. Two main questions were asked. First, did the grant increase the 
municipal expenditure for services to functionally impaired? Second, did 
the information associated with the grant (standardized cost) change the 
spatial interaction among neighboring municipalities? To answer these 
questions, the data was divided into two time periods: before and after the 
introduction of the LSS expenditure equalization grant. The results show 
that when municipalities received the grant in the second period, the 
expenditure increased for the LSS services by approximately nine percent. 
While the effect of the LSS grant on expenditures is positive, neither the 
general grant nor the tax base seems to have any effect on the 
expenditures. But given that the effect of the LSS grant is greater than the 
no-effect of the tax base, it can be interpreted as evidence of the flypaper 
effect, i.e. expenditures are increased by grants.  
 
There is evidence of significant spatial interaction among the 
municipalities when setting their LSS expenditure level in the first time 
period. Although it is difficult to distinguish the cause of the spatial 32                              Intergovernmental Grants and Local Public Expenditures…  
interaction, it is argued that in this case, the spatial interaction is due to 
mimicking. This is reasonable since the LSS service provision is relatively 
new to the municipalities, and the municipalities may not have full 
information on how to provide the service or what the level of 
expenditure should be. Thus, the information spillover from neighboring 
municipalities is used when setting their own expenditure level. With the 
introduction of the grant in 2004, the result shows that the spatial 
interaction is no longer evident, which supports the hypothesis that the 
standardized costs information provided by the grant may be viewed as a 
signal of what the actual expenditure level ought to be. This further 
supports the hypothesis that municipalities did mimic their neighbors to 
get information. Moreover, the lack of evidence for the spatial interaction 
after the implementation of the LSS-EQ grant could also to some extent 
be due to the decreased use of cooperation agreements. The source of 
spatial interactions among local governments can help provide important 
patterns and behaviors of government reforms and decentralization, such 
as the LSS-act. 
 
Since the LSS service is regulated by an entitlement law, municipalities 
must grant LSS services to those eligible, even if it is expensive for the 
municipalities. Therefore, it must be noted that, on the margin, only 9 
SEK per 100 SEK of the LSS expenditure equalization grant are used 
toward the LSS service. Since municipalities have a limited budget, 
increases in the expenditure – due to an increase in the number of 
individuals granted LSS service or an extension of the LSS-act – may 
instead affect other areas of the municipal service, for example, education 
or elderly care, i.e. areas where it may be easier to save.  
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Finally, the model studied here measures the average effects on LSS 
expenditure of an increase in intergovernmental grants and the tax base. 
However, is likely that every municipality is not affected in the same way; 
there is almost certainly heterogeneity among the municipalities. The 
standard deviation for the grant variables is large in most cases as well, 
indicating heterogeneity. While some municipalities would probably have 
been greatly affected by the grant, others would probably show a much 
smaller effect. Therefore, future studies on this issue may find it 
worthwhile to take this heterogeneity into account when studying the 
effect of the grants on the municipalities’ LSS expenditures.   
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Appendix A. Description of the two LSS Grants  
LSS temporary grant 2001 – 2003 
During 2001-2003, the government distributed an LSS grant to 
municipalities with extraordinarily high costs for their LSS service, based 
on the Legislative Proposal 1999/2000:115. The grant was functioning as 
“high cost protection” (högkostnadsskydd) for the municipalities. The grant 
was temporary; the intention was to distribute the grant for two years 
only, 2001-2002, until the new LSS expenditure equalization grant system 
would be implemented. The temporary grant was later extended to also 
include 2003.   
 
LSS expenditure equalization, 2004-present 
The  LSS expenditure equalization (LSS-EQ) is a national equalization 
system31, completely separate from the ordinary General grant system for 
income and cost equalization. The purpose of the LSS-EQ system is to 
equalize the cost for LSS among municipalities via an intra-municipality 
system. The decision to implement the LSS expenditure equalization 
system was based on the Legislative Proposal 2002/03:151. Below is a 
description of how the LSS equalization grant/fee is calculated.  
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for special support to persons with functional impairments” (2002/03:151) and the federal 
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Calculation of the LSS Equalization grant/fee for the year 200432,33 
The equalization is based on three different sources: standardized cost for 
LSS services; differences in concentration of LSS activity; and differences 
in the need of care for individuals with LSS services. However, between 
2004 and 2008, certain transition rules apply; therefore, the system will not 
be fully implemented until the year 2009. The transition rule consists of a 
maximum fee amount, as well as a maximum grant amount. For municipalities 
receiving the grant, the received grant amount will be reduced by 270, 70, 
15 SEK for the years 2004, 2005 and 2006, respectively (per capita). 
Similarly, for municipalities paying the fee, the maximum fee cannot 
exceed 250, 550, 850, 1150 and 1450 SEK for the years 2004, 2005, 2006, 
2007 and 2008, respectively (per capita). During the transition period, the 
federal government covers the difference between the grant and the fee.  
 
A. Calculation of Standardized-cost for LSS-services 
The calculation for standardized cost is based on the number of LSS 
services granted according to the LSS-act 1993:387 and a national average 
cost per type of LSS service.34 The information on the number of LSS 
services was provided by the National Board of Health and Welfare 
(NBHW), and it was measured on September 1, 2002. The national 
average cost per type of LSS services is based on the municipalities’ 
annual accounts. The standardized cost is then calculated by multiplying 
the number of services with the national average cost.   
32 The information is based on Statistics Sweden’s description “Economic equalization for local 
government and equalization of municipal costs for support and service for persons with certain functional 
impairments” at www.scb.se
33 The calculations for the years 2005, 2006 and 2007 are similar to this.
34 The compensation for personal assistance according to LASS is provided by the Social 
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B. Differences in cost due to some activity are concentrated to certain municipalities 
The standardized-cost from A is multiplied with the so-called concentration-
index. The concentration-index is based on how the average-cost per LSS 
service is affected by the share of individuals with impairments in a 
municipality. The purpose of this calculation is to reduce the economies 
of scale and compensate for “small scale economies”. To minimize the 
risk of “strategic planning” by the municipalities, this index is not updated 
yearly, nor does it have any fixed schedule for when it will be updated. It 
is the government that decides when the indexes should be updated.  
 
The number of individuals in a municipality that are entitled to LSS 
services is set in relation to the municipality’s population. The share for 
the municipality is then divided by the calculated share of individuals with 
LSS services for the whole nation. Moreover, that result is then raised to 
the power of -0.16, which will then be the municipality’s concentration-
index. The value of the exponent explains the strength of the index. 
Municipalities with a higher share than the national average get to deduct 
an amount when calculating the standardized cost, and municipalities with 
a lower share than the national average must add an amount when 
calculating the standardized cost. The information about the number of 
individuals receiving LSS services was provided by the National Board of 
Health and Welfare and was measured on September 1, 2002.  
 
C. Differences in cost due to differences in the need (level) of support and services  
To measure the differences in cost that are due to differences in the level 
of support needed, a personnel-cost index is used. The index measures the 
“level of care” for the individuals that get services according to the LSS-Intergovernmental Grants and Local Public Expenditures…                              43 
act. The calculation is based on information from a number of 
municipalities’ annual accounts for the year 2002. The index corresponds 
to 70 percent of the difference between the municipality’s own reported 
personnel cost and the personnel cost that is the basic standardized cost 
as described in point A above. The reason for only compensating 70 
percent of the difference is to reduce the risk that the compensation will 
compensate for the differences in efficiency and political ambitions and 
not the intended level of need.  
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This paper examines whether local public expenditures on services to 
functionally impaired individuals crowd out other local public 
expenditures in Sweden. Over the last ten years, these expenditures have 
increased by more than 90 percent while other municipal expenditures 
have experienced increases of up to 30 percent. The impact of 
expenditures on functionally impaired individuals is tested on five 
different spending areas using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) fixed-
effects model. While the results give no support for crowding out in the 
areas of social assistance, culture & leisure, and childcare & preschool, a 
negative relationship on spending for elderly & disabled care and 
education is found, suggesting that crowding out indeed occurs within the 
municipal sector. The negative relationships are significant both in a 
statistical and an economic sense.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines whether local public expenditures on one particular 
service tend to crowd out other local public expenditures. The specific 
service studied here, services to functionally impaired individuals, became 
the responsibility of the municipalities via a reform in 1994. At the same 
time, a new law imposed by the national government was implemented. 
The law, called the LSS-act1, is an entitlement law geared towards 
individuals with functional impairments.2 Since the reform and the 
implementation of the LSS-act, there has been a considerable increase in 
the expenditures on services to functionally impaired individuals. Reforms 
and decentralization of public activities are meant to increase efficiency 
and accountability to the local government. This is one of the main 
theoretical arguments for decentralizing public activities; the local 
governments are in a better position to provide basic services because 
they are better informed about individual demands than the national 
government (Oates, 1972). When a national government imposes new 
services and responsibility on the local governments, appropriate funding 
is not always provided. If not, this could also affect other areas of the local 
government. With new responsibilities and with a limited budget, the local 
government must prioritize its public service provision in other ways than 
previously. In such cases, expenditures on one type of service could crowd 
out expenditures on other services; thereby affecting the level of services 
provided in the other areas. Naturally, this could happen without new 
1 LSS-act = Act on Support and Services for Certain Disabled Persons, LSS 1993:387. 
2 Throughout this paper, the terms “services for functional impaired” and “LSS services” 
are used interchangeably. Similarly, “LSS expenditures” and “expenditure on services to 
functionally impaired” are also used interchangeably. 2                                    Do Local Public Expenditures…
regulations or decentralization – for example, expenditures on health care 
continue to increase throughout the world, which puts a burden on 
government budget and spending allocation. Similarly, the elderly 
population is growing larger, which also puts a burden on government 
budgets.   
 
It is important to study what are the effects of reforms and new services 
on how expenditures are determined within the local government. First, it 
is important in order to identify the area(s) within the local governments 
that are affected by new national government policies, such as 
decentralization or reforms of public service provision, especially areas 
that may not be directly associated with the reform or policy. Second, if 
some categories of public service provision are strongly regulated, will this 
cause expenditure in other areas to be crowded out? That is, are certain 
categories of spending more prone to expenditure crowding out than 
others? It would be important to identify these areas when implementing 
reforms or nationally imposed services. 
 
Empirical research on public expenditure is usually based on the seminal 
work of Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman 
(1973), where the demand for local public services is regarded as a 
function of the characteristics of the median voter. The expenditure 
problem for the local government is then treated in a similar way as 
consumer choices in the private sector. In empirical applications, 
determinants also include economic, demographic and geographical 
characteristics of the local government, for example tax base, population 
size, age structure, intergovernmental grants, as well as other institutional 
and socio-economic factors. This work was later extended by Deacon Do Local Public Expenditures…                                                                   3 
(1978) to include the composition of public expenditure. Local 
expenditures (and services) can also be related to other tiers of the 
government. Aronsson, Lundberg and Wikström (2000) show that local 
public expenditure is not only explained by local government 
characteristics but could also be explained by the service 
provision/expenditures of the regional level government; the expenditure 
decisions at different levels are interdependent. These studies, among 
others, show that an expenditure decision in one area affects expenditure 
decisions in other areas, either within the local government or among 
different tiers of governments.  
 
Previous studies dealing with expenditure crowding out have found no or 
only limited support for the crowding out hypothesis. For example, 
Fossett and Wyckoff (1996) studied the impact on spending on public 
education of increasing spending on Medicaid. Their results show no 
significant effect on educational expenditures. Instead, their findings 
indicate that changes in educational spending respond to changes in the 
states’ own-source revenue rather than increases in Medicaid spending. 
McCarty and Schmidt (1997) use a vector autoregressive framework to 
study whether interaction in expenditures from six government spending 
categories shows any evidence of crowding out; they find no support for 
the crowding out hypothesis. Rather, increases in spending in one 
category are paid for by increases in tax revenue rather than being due to 
crowding out of other expenditures. Finally, the most recent study (to my 
knowledge), Landon, McMillan, Muralidharan and Parsons (2006), uses a 
panel of Canadian data and examines whether health care spending 4                                    Do Local Public Expenditures…
crowds out other provisional government spending and, as in the previous 
studies, it finds no support for the crowding out hypothesis.3 
 
The hypothesis to be investigated in this paper is whether increased 
expenditures – due to a nationally imposed reform – in one area affect 
other expenditure areas within the local government. More specifically, 
does the expenditure on services to functionally impaired individuals 
crowd out other municipal expenditures? Although the local government 
has the autonomy to set its own local tax rates, the income from taxes 
does not fully cover the municipal service provision.4 Moreover, the 
excess burden of an increase in the tax rate is greater with higher tax rates; 
therefore, it could be very costly if municipalities would further increase 
the local tax rate (since the tax rates already are high in Sweden). This is 
why municipalities are reluctant to increase the tax rates. Consequently, 
when an area within the local government experiences high increases in 
expenditures, other areas are likely to be affected. In that sense, this study 
differs from previous studies on expenditure crowding out. 
 
The crowding out hypothesis will be tested on five spending categories of 
the municipalities: elderly & disabled care; education; social assistance, 
childcare & preschool; and culture & leisure. These five categories make 
up the majority of municipal spending (about 90 percent); where the total 
expenditures of the municipalities in Sweden amounted to 423 billion 
                                                     
3 See also the studies of Brazer and McCarty (1986) and Marlow and Shiers (1999); the first 
is a study of the “municipal overburden” hypothesis and the second concerns the effect of 
law enforcement spending on education spending. Neither of the studies finds support for 
expenditure crowding out. 
4 Income from taxes covered about 68 percent of the municipal service provision in 2007. 
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SEK in 2007. The responsibility to perform care and services for 
individuals with functional impairment became the responsibility of the 
municipalities (transferred from the county councils) via a reform in 1994. 
Ever since this reform, there has been a significant increase in the 
expenditures for services to functionally impaired, and the burden of the 
rise in the expenditure has had a considerable effect on municipalities. 
Over the last ten years, the expenditures for functionally impaired have 
increased by more than 90 percent while other municipal expenditures 
have experienced increases of between 15 and 30 percent. However, this 
does not constitute any evidence of expenditure crowding out; it could 
just reflect other reasons for why there has been an increase in this 
expenditure. To support the crowding out hypothesis, increases in 
expenditure for functionally impaired must have negative effects on other 
expenditures in such a way that this cannot be explained by other factors 
determining the expenditures.  
 
Following earlier literature on expenditure crowding out, this paper aims 
at empirically examining the crowding out hypothesis on Swedish 
municipal expenditure data. The contribution of this paper is twofold; 
first, it adds to the literature on local public expenditure by analyzing the 
effect of a nationally imposed reform on local public expenditures in 
Sweden. Second, the increased demand for publicly provided services (due 
to the growing share of elderly and increasing health care expenditures, 
for example) increases the pressure on the public service budget. So, this 
topic is indeed important with regards to expenditures and public policy in 
Sweden. It could also be important in other countries experiencing an 
increased demand for public services.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes 
municipal characteristics and expenditure patterns in Sweden; Section 3 
describes and discusses the hypotheses and the data. Section 4 describes 
and discusses the empirical specification and the method. Section 5 
presents the empirical findings, while concluding remarks can be found in 
section 6. 
 
2. Municipality Services and Expenditures 
Sweden is divided into 290 municipalities and 21 counties. Municipalities 
are responsible for public activities such as social services, elderly care, 
education and infrastructure. The main task of the counties is to provide 
healthcare. There is no hierarchical relation between municipalities and 
counties since they are responsible for different activities.5 Some of the 
municipality activities are regulated by law or have guidelines; while other 
municipality activities are provided for on a voluntary basis. For example, 
the municipalities are legally responsible for providing social services, 
elderly care, support for disabled, primary and secondary education, and 
water and sewerage. Although legally responsible, the municipalities have 
some flexibility to decide themselves how to perform their duties and 
distribute the resources. Leisure activities, cultural activities6 and industrial 
and commercial services are examples of activities that the municipalities 
provide on a voluntary basis without any regulations.  
 
In Figure 1, the distribution of all municipal expenditures for the year 
2004 is presented. The year is chosen to represent an average year within 
                                                     
5 The only exception is Gotland, where the municipality also has the responsibilities 
normally associated with a county council.  
6 Except for the provision of libraries in the municipalities. Do Local Public Expenditures…                                                                   7 
the time frame of the study. The municipal service expenditure is divided 
into six main categories: care and service for elderly & disabled and 
functionally impaired; education; childcare & preschool; social assistance; 
culture & leisure; and a residual category. The five first categories 
constitute 90 percent of the total spending of municipalities. The residual 
category consists of various expenditures grouped together (e.g. 
infrastructure, environmental protection, tourism), which makes up about 
ten percent of municipalities’ total spending.   
 




As can be seen in the figure, expenditures on education and expenditures 
on elderly & disabled and functionally impaired individuals are the two 
largest service areas within municipalities; each constitutes one third of the 
total spending of the municipalities.7 The social service sector of the 
municipalities includes care and services for elderly & disabled and 
7 Services to elderly & disabled and services to functionally impaired belong to the same 
overall service area; however, the municipal expenditure data differentiate between the two 
groups which makes it possible to study the effect of expenditure on services to 
functionally impaired individuals. 
Social  
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functionally impaired; but it also contains social assistance for individuals 
and families. The latter includes, for example, welfare assistance, help and 
services for children and young people, families, individuals abusing drugs 
or alcohol, and women who have been subjected to violence.8  
 
Service and care for elderly & disabled includes accommodations for 
those in need of special support. For example, the municipalities must 
arrange housing for people who, for physical or mental reasons, encounter 
considerable difficulties in their daily lives and need special 
accommodation. Services to individuals with functional impairments are 
regulated in an entitlement law, the LSS-act. Included in the LSS-act are 
services such as personal assistance, special housing accommodation, 
contact persons and daily activities (National Board of Health and 
Welfare, NBHW). 
 
The expenditure on services to functionally impaired amounts to almost 
one third of the total spending on elderly & disabled and functionally 
impaired. To put this into a context, about 0.6 percent of the Swedish 
population received services according to the LSS-act, while the number 
of potential users of elderly care (individuals aged above 75) amounted to 
about 8.7 percent; this can give us an idea of how expensive the LSS 
service provision is for the municipalities. As already mentioned, there has 
been a sharp increase in the expenditure on LSS over the years since it was 
first implemented.  
 
                                                     
8 The measures may be advice, financial aid, family law or family counseling. In special 
cases, certain measures can be implemented without the individual's consent. This applies 
to care of children and young people and care of adult drug and alcohol abusers. Do Local Public Expenditures…                                                                   9 




In Figures 2 and 3, the municipal expenditure for each sector is presented 
(in real terms). While Figure 2 shows the composition of expenditures 
during 1998-2007, Figure 3 shows the development in expenditures as 
compared to the year 1998. LSS expenditure is separated from spending 
on the elderly & disabled for illustrative purposes, in order to see exactly 
how much more LSS expenditure has increased as compared to all other 
expenditure in the municipalities. 
As is evident in the figures, not only does care for elderly & disabled and 
functionally impaired have the highest spending, it is also the area within 
the municipality experiencing the highest increase in its expenditure. While 
the expenditures for elderly & disabled care increased by 30 percent 
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percent.9 As a reference, it can be mentioned that during the same period, 
there was an increase in the tax base of 32 percent. 
 




Although it is evident that there has been a considerable increase in 
spending on LSS services and they are taking a larger share of the 
municipal budget, this could just be the result of spending readjustments, 
reflecting changes in demand for different public services. Since both the 
expenditure for the elderly & disabled and expenditure for the functionally 
impaired have increased, this may just reflect that there has been an 
increase in the elderly population. Therefore, to support the crowding out 
hypothesis, the distribution of expenditures must be such that the areas 
on which there is a negative impact of LSS expenditure would have 
received more resources and a higher level of spending had it not been for 
the potential burden of the LSS expenditure.  
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3. Hypothesis and Data  
The crowding out hypothesis will be tested on five broad spending areas: 
spending on elderly & disabled care; education; childcare & preschool; 
social assistance; and culture & leisure. This section starts out with a 
discussion of the crowding out hypothesis, and why increased 
expenditures on services to functionally impaired could affect each of the 
five spending areas. The section ends with a presentation of the data. 
 
Crowding out hypothesis  
The hypothesis to be tested in this paper is if expenditures on services to 
functionally impaired crowd out other municipality spending. When the 
local government is faced with increasing expenditure in one area, due to a 
national reform, decentralization of public services, new laws, or just an 
increasing share of demand for some services, the municipality must 
redistribute the given resources within their set budget. The municipal 
budget is limited in the sense that the municipality’s own source of 
income, taxes, does not fully cover the municipal service provision.10 And 
although the local governments in Sweden have the autonomy to set their 
own local tax rates, the excess burden of an increase in the tax rate could 
be very high for the municipalities, thus making it difficult to motivate 
further tax increases.11 Therefore, with new areas of responsibilities and 
with a limited budget, the municipalities may be forced to redistribute 
their resources from one area to another.  
10 Municipal income also consists of governmental grants, tax equalization, and fees. 
11 Moreover, different measures for restricting the municipalities in increasing their own 
tax rate have been in place during the 1990’s. During 1991-1993, it was prohibited to 
increase the tax rate. In 1994, municipalities that did not increase their tax rate received 
economic compensation. During 1997-1999, municipalities that increased the tax rate 
received less governmental grants (Halápi, 2008). 12                                    Do Local Public Expenditures…
When municipalities redistribute their resources, it is not likely that every 
area will be affected in the same way. One reason why the effect will not 
be the same is that the cost associated with decreasing resources is 
different in different areas. As discussed in the previous section, most of 
the municipalities’ duties are regulated by law or there are guidelines; 
therefore, if a service is strictly regulated, the cost of not providing the 
service could be very high. First, not providing the service could lead to 
lawsuits and fines. Second, deviating from a given norm could also be 
costly; this would send a negative signal to both voters (perhaps not to 
reelect the politicians) and potential individuals moving to this 
municipality. Individuals have preferences on what they want their local 
governments to provide, such as level of education and recreational 
services. Individuals choose to migrate and live in areas whose local 
government best satisfy their preferences. This argument was originally 
presented by Tiebout (1956). In a migration study on Swedish data, 
Dahlberg, Eklöf, Fredriksson and Jofre-Monseny (2008) examine the 
impact of local public services on migration behavior. They find that given 
taxes, high spending on child care and “other” expenditures (i.e. culture, 
parks and recreations, welfare assistance, and administration) attract 
migrants, while they do not find any conclusive result on elderly care and 
education.  
 
The size of a service area is another reason that determines if an area will 
be affected by the increased expenditure. It may be less noticeable to 
decrease resources in a large service area than in a small area. The 
marginal disutility of a decrease in total expenditure in a large area is likely 
to be less than in smaller area. Therefore, it is likely that the resource 
allocation (and/or crowding out) would be from a larger area where it may Do Local Public Expenditures…                                                                  13 
be easier to decrease spending without greatly affecting the service 
provision. A third reason why different areas can be differently affected is 
that expenditure decisions within the local government or between 
different tiers of governments (for example, local and regional level) are 
interdependent (Aronsson et al., 2000).12 When there is an issue of non-
separability between two publicly provided services, they can either be 
substitutes or compliments to each other. If the services are substitutes, an 
increase in the expenditure in one area will then decrease the expenditure 
in the other area, via reduced demand. On the other hand, if the services 
are complementary, then increased demand for one service will also 
increase the demand for the other service, thus increasing the expenditure 
in both areas.   
 
Elderly & disabled  
There are at least three reasons why the first spending area – elderly & 
disabled – may be crowded out by LSS expenditure. First, services to 
elderly & disabled belong to the same service area as services to the 
functionally impaired; and people eligible for services according to the 
LSS-act may have had services covered by the elderly & disabled area, but 
are now instead receiving services according to the LSS-act. In such cases, 
the services to functionally impaired individuals may be viewed as a 
substitute for the care to elderly & disabled. Second, the care for elderly & 
disabled is regulated by the Social Service Act (SoL 2001:453), which is a 
12Aronsson et al. (2000) study if county (regional) expenditures affect municipal (local) 
expenditures. In their model, county expenditure can affect municipal expenditures via a 
tax base effect (using the same source of revenue) and a direct effect (in the cases where 
the expenditures at the county level and the municipal level are non-separable). Their result 
suggests a positive correlation between county and municipal expenditures. This implies 
that municipal and county expenditures are complements in the utility function and/or 
that county expenditures and private consumption are substitutes.  14                                    Do Local Public Expenditures…
law, but not as strong as the LSS-act. Third, the elderly & disabled area is 
the largest sector of the municipalities. For these reasons, some resources 
from the elderly & disabled service area are likely to be allocated to 
services to functionally impaired.  
 
Education  
For the second spending area, education, LSS expenditure may also crowd 
out spending. Education is the second largest sector of the municipal 
service provision, and although this is an area that affects a group of 
individuals having strong preferences for school quality, education may 
still be an area affected by the high LSS expenditures. Since this is a large 
spending area, it may not be very noticeable when there are decreases in 
total expenditure for education. Therefore, it is likely that the education 




The third spending area, social assistance, is part of the same large social 
sector as elderly & disabled and functionally impaired. Therefore, if the 
LSS service area requires more resources, some of the resources may be 
redistributed from social assistance. On the other hand, social assistance is 
regulated in the Social Service Act and there is a strict lower limit on the 
level of welfare and assistance. Therefore, it may not be possible for 
municipalities to crowd out social assistance resources. In addition, social 
assistance represents a minor part of the budget; it may be difficult to 
decrease the resources without greatly affecting the provision. 
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Childcare & preschool 
Childcare & preschool may or may not be affected by the LSS 
expenditure; the spending does not constitute a large share of the total 
municipal budget. Similar to the education area, childcare & preschool is 
also an area where there might be strong preferences in the community 
for a high quality of services. However, contrary to the education area 
though, childcare & preschool only constitute a smaller share of the total 
municipal budget, therefore, it may be more difficult to redistribute 
resources without affecting the quality of this services too much.  
 
Culture & leisure 
The last spending area, culture & leisure, is the only area  in which 
provision is unregulated. If municipalities are short of resources, they 
could use money allocated to culture & leisure, since there is no law 
regulating this provision. However, the budget share for culture and 
leisure is rather modest, and municipalities may not want to decrease this 
level in order to allocate resources to other areas. Culture & leisure is an 
area that is highly visible in a municipality, besides being an area that many 
people care about; therefore, municipalities may be reluctant to decrease 
spending here. If spending on culture & leisure were to decrease, it may 
send a signal to the inhabitants about the performance of the municipality, 
which may not be viewed as favorable. Furthermore, for those inhabitants 
with strong preference for culture & leisure, with a decrease in the 
spending area they may choose to migrate to other regions providing 
culture & leisure that better satisfy their preference instead.  
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Data and descriptive statistics 
The data set consists of 288 municipalities over the time period 1998-
2007. The public expenditure variables are expressed as expenditure per 
capita, measured in Swedish kronor (SEK). All monetary variables are 
adjusted to the 2007 year price level using the consumer price index, CPI.  
 
To make comparisons of the impact of LSS expenditures, the dependent 
variable is defined in the same way for all five categories. The explanatory 
variables include municipality-level variables in order to control for 
differences in basic economic conditions among the municipalities. The 
explanatory variables included in the study are standard in studies of local 
public expenditure, i.e. tax base, intergovernmental grants13 and long-term 
debt. The percent of unemployed and the share of the population on 
welfare benefits are also included, as are the population shares of different 
age groups. The local budget for a particular year is decided in November 
the previous year and thus, all municipal characteristics’ are lagged one 
time period, since this is the information that contains economic and 
demographic conditions for the previous years. For the elderly & disabled 
spending equation, two additional explanatory variables are included. 
These two variables are included to capture the difference in cost for the 
services and care (it is significantly more costly to provide special 
residence for elderly, than to provide care and service to elderly in their 
own home). Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in Table 1, 
                                                     
13 The grant variable is defined as the total sum of grants, per capita. The composition of 
grants to the municipalities changed during the time period studied. Until 2004, the grants 
consisted of general grants and intramunicipal equalization. From 2005, the general grant is 
part of the income equalization grant/fee.  Do Local Public Expenditures…                                                                  17 
and variable definition and data sources for the variables are presented in 
Table A1 in the Appendix.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 1999-2007  
    1999-2007    1999  2007 
Variable  Mean  Std.Dev    Min  Max     Mean  Mean 
Dependent variable(s)                
   Elderly & Disabled care spending  10696  3023  2723  24599    9462  11650 
   Childcare & Preschool spending  5121  1032  2855  9730    4714  5847 
   Education spending  14336  1727  7682  21924    12832  15144 
   Social Assistance spending  2310  805  559  5880    2118  2521 
   Culture & Leisure spending  2081  533  537  4944    1977  2200 
Explanatory variables                 
   Expenditures for services  
   for functionally impaired (LSS)  3725  1334  223  9658    2730  4538 
   Home service (Elderly care) percent  8.3  2.4  0  30    7.8  11.9 
   Special residence (Elderly care) percent  7.1  1.8  1.4  14.9    7.9  5.9 
Municipal and Socioeconomic  
explanatory variables 1998-2006             
   Tax base   124229  19717  83755  267155    108089  141718 
   Grants  8524  4891  -16399  24700    9054  7808 
   Debt (long-term)  11103  11166  0  78252    9743  11450 
   Population, log  4.3  0.4  3.4  5.9    4.3  4.3 
   Welfare, percent  4.5  1.9  0  15.8    6.3  3.8 
   Unemployment, percent  3.9  1.4  0.9  11    4.9  3.4 
   Population age 0-6, percent  7.3  1.1  4.7  11.8    8.1  7.2 
   Population age 7-15, percent  12.2  1.2  6.5  16.4    12.2  11.2 
   Population age 75+, percent  9.7  2.2  2.8  16    9.5  9.9 
Instruments for LSS expenditure             
   LSS Daily Activity, percent   44.7  12  0  100    44.7  46.6 
   LSS Adult Residential home, percent  35.1  12  0  72    35.6  35.4 
   LSS individuals per 10000 inhabitants  59.1  18  10  160     52.6  64.4 
Note: All monetary units are measured in Swedish kronor (SEK) and adjusted to the 2007 price level 
using CPI. Each dependent variable as well as the LSS expenditure is measured in per capita terms. 
The variables tax base, grants, and debt are also measured in per capita terms.  18                                    Do Local Public Expenditures…
As will be discussed section IV, to account for simultaneity and 
endogeneity when testing the hypothesis of LSS expenditure crowding out 
other municipal spending, instrumental variables are needed that directly 
affect LSS expenditure but not expenditure for the dependent variable(s). 
The instruments that will be used are the three most important 
determining factors for LSS expenditure. The three instruments are: the 
number of individuals in a municipality that receive LSS services (per 
10000 inhabitants), the share of individuals receiving LSS services that 
lives in “adult residential homes” (the most expensive service), and the 
share of individuals receiving LSS services that gets the service “daily 
activity” (the most common service). The properties of the instruments 
will also be discussed in section IV. 
 
Merged data and missing observations 
Today, Sweden consists of 290 municipalities; however, during the time 
period studied in this paper, two municipalities have seceded (Nykvarn in 
1999 and Knivsta in 2003) from two other municipalities. In order not to 
lose observations or geographical data, the seceded municipalities have 
been merged back with their respective “original” municipalities in this 
study. Expenditure data are missing for a few observations (approximately 
20 observations out of a total of 17280 observations). In lieu of the 
missing values, I have used the mean of the previous and following year; 
i.e. when the missing value was for the year 1998, I used the value for 
1999. The result of the estimation is unaffected whether I include or 
exclude these observations. Due to the sensitive nature of the LSS data, 
values for municipalities that only have one, two, or three individuals with 
a particular LSS service are not available. Therefore, the value two is used Do Local Public Expenditures…                                                                  19 
in lieu of the non-available data. For a detailed description of LSS services 
and expenditure, see Birkelöf (2008). 
 
4. Empirical specification and method  
A standard empirical model for determining government expenditure is 
usually expressed in a linear specification. Following this approach, a 
fixed-effects model of municipal spending that accounts for time and 
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The inclusion of L in equation (1) allows LSS spending to have a direct 
impact on expenditures for the spending category studied, while holding 
other factors determining that category constant, as would be suggested 
by the crowding out hypothesis. However, since all five categories studied 
here are services provided by the municipalities, the resources are 
allocated from the same overall budget. That is, the expenditure for some 
14 The results are robust to the choice between a linear and a log-linear empirical model: a 
logarithm version of the equation yields the same sign and significance of the coefficients. 
15 Additional explanatory variables for elderly care are included for the spending category 
“Elderly & disabled care spending” (the variables are measured at time t for municipality i).  20                                    Do Local Public Expenditures…
or all of the spending categories may be simultaneously decided with the 
expenditure for LSS. In such a case, LSS spending is endogenous and it is 
correlated with the error term in equation (1). When a right-hand side 
variable is correlated with the error term, it implies that using OLS yields 
biased and inconsistent estimates (Baltagi, 2002; Green, 2003). If the LSS 
expenditure is endogenous in the expenditure equation(s), the OLS will 
underestimate the impact of LSS expenditure (in absolute terms); i.e. the 
estimated effect will be too modest. Therefore, to correct for the 
simultaneity bias in the equation, the endogenous variable, LSS 
expenditure, must be replaced with variables that are highly correlated 
with the LSS expenditure but not correlated with the error term in 
equation (1).  
 
One way of correcting for the simultaneity bias is to use instrumental 
variables for the endogenous explanatory variable and then using the two-
stage-least-squares (2SLS) estimation method. The instruments used in 
this study are the three most important determining factors for LSS 
expenditure; the number of individuals with LSS services and two of the 
services provided. The LSS variables are argued to be exogenous to the 
spending category studied, for example, spending on elderly & disabled. 
However, one might ask why LSS expenditure is endogenous, while 
factors determining LSS expenditures are exogenous? This is due to the 
characteristics of the LSS service provision: the LSS services are governed 
by a strict entitlement law and to be granted LSS services, the functional 
impairment must be “severe and permanent”. A person granted LSS 
service(s) in one municipality is not necessarily granted the same service(s) 
if moving to another municipality; therefore, migrating to another Do Local Public Expenditures…                                                                  21 
municipality is not common among those granted LSS services.16 
Furthermore, individuals receiving LSS services one year are most likely 
receiving them the next year as well, so the number of individuals can be 
seen as exogenous with regard to other municipal services. Rather than 
decreasing the number of individuals who are granted LSS services, the 
resources for providing the LSS service may change (e.g. fewer personnel). 
If there is a change in the resources for providing LSS services, it is not 
exogenous to the other spending category. So while the LSS expenditure 
may be correlated with other spending categories, the number of 
individuals receiving LSS services should not be correlated with spending and it 
can therefore be used as an instrument. Both two-stage-least-squares 
(2SLS) and OLS will be used to estimate the equations, and the results 
from these will be presented in next section.  
 
If an increase in LSS expenditure causes the municipal government to 
systematically reduce spending on other services (from the level they 
would otherwise choose), the parameter estimating the impact of LSS 
expenditures on the spending category studied should be significant and 
negative. However, if the parameter differed insignificantly from zero, this 
would indicate that the changes in the spending category are determined 
by changes in exogenous factors only and thus, the level of LSS 
expenditures does not directly affect the choice of spending category. If 
so, this would be interpreted as no evidence or support of the crowding 
out hypothesis. 
 
16 A person who has been granted LSS services and wants to move to another municipality 
must apply six months beforehand to the new municipality with regard to the level of 
service the new municipality will offer. 22                                    Do Local Public Expenditures…
Finally, municipality fixed effects are included to control for unobserved 
municipality factors that remain fixed over time. Dummy variables for 
year fixed effects are also included.  
 
5. Empirical results and discussion 
In this section, the regression results from the five spending categories are 
presented and discussed. The section starts out with a test against 
endogeneity of the LSS expenditure variable, followed by a discussion of 
the validity and relevance of the instruments used. The section ends with 
the presentation and discussion of the regression estimates: the results for 
elderly & disabled care and education spending are presented in Table 3, 
and the results for social assistance, childcare & preschool, and culture & 
leisure spending are presented in Table 4.17  
 
Test against endogeneity  
As discussed in the previous section, the expenditure on some or all of the 
spending categories may be simultaneously decided with the expenditure 
on LSS. Therefore, a test of whether LSS expenditure can be treated as 
exogenous is performed. Under the null hypothesis that the specified 
endogenous regressor can actually be treated as exogenous, the test 
statistic is distributed as chi-squared with one degree of freedom.18 The 
test results are presented in Table 2. 
                                                     
17 In the regressions where the LSS expenditure variable is endogenous, the OLS estimates 
are just included for comparison; vice versa, in the regressions where the LSS expenditure 
variable can be treated as exogenous, the 2SLS estimates are just included for comparison. 
18 Degrees of freedom are equal to the number of regressors tested, in this case only one 
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As can be seen in the Table 2, we reject the null hypothesis that LSS 
expenditure can be treated as exogenous in the elderly & disabled care 
spending equation as well as in the education spending equation. That is, 
LSS expenditure is simultaneously determined with both these spending 
categories. These results are as expected. The LSS services and elderly & 
disabled care are part of the same service area and the same social service 
sector budget; the expenditures are therefore decided simultaneously. For 
education, this result is also as expected. Education is one of the two 
largest sectors within municipality service, and when allocating budget to 
the educational sector, it will depend on the cost of services to 
functionally impaired, among other things. 
 
Table 2. Test if LSS expenditure per capita can be treated as exogenous 
Spending category / 









Elderly & Disabled Care  3.28  0.070  Yes  2SLS 
Education  9.63  0.002  Yes  2SLS 
Social Assistance  0.24  0.627  No  OLS 
Childcare & Preschool   0.20  0.655  No  OLS 
Culture & Leisure  1.90  0.168  No  OLS 
 
For the three other categories, social assistance, childcare & preschool, 
and culture & leisure, we fail to reject the null hypothesis. That is, LSS 
expenditure can be treated as exogenous in the spending equations for 
these three categories. For the two latter categories, this is what was 
expected. However, it might be surprising that social assistance and LSS 
expenditure are not simultaneously decided, despite being in the same 
social service sector. The reason for this is probably that social assistance 24                                    Do Local Public Expenditures…
is closely regulated in the Social Service Act, and that changes in spending 
on social assistance are not affected by LSS expenditures.  
Validity of instruments  
Since we reject the hypothesis that LSS expenditures can be treated as 
exogenous for the elderly & disabled and education spending categories, 
instruments are used to obtain unbiased results. The instruments chosen 
must be correlated with the endogenous regressor, but uncorrelated with 
the error term (Green, 2003). To test if the instruments are correlated with 
the endogenous regressor, a test of underidentification is performed. The 
hypothesis – that the excluded instruments are not correlated with the 
endogenous regressor – is rejected for both the elderly & disabled care 
model and the education model; i.e. the instruments are relevant. The test 
statistic is reported in Table 3.  
 
To test if the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, an 
overidentification test is performed. The Hansen J-statistic for this test is 
reported in Table 3. According to the test, for both elderly & disabled care 
and education spending categories, the hypothesis that the instruments are 
valid cannot be rejected, indicating that the instruments are in fact valid. 
To sum up, the LSS expenditure variable is endogenous in the models for 
elderly & disabled care expenditure and education expenditure. 
Furthermore, both the underidentification and the overidentification tests 
confirm that the chosen instruments (the three LSS services variables) are, 
in fact, both valid and relevant instruments.  
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Regression results  
Spending on Elderly & disabled care 
Let us start with the elderly & disabled care spending category. As 
mentioned earlier, if LSS expenditure is endogenous in the model(s), the 
magnitude of the effect of LSS expenditure on elderly & disabled care 
spending will be underestimated by OLS. By comparing OLS and 2SLS 
estimates for spending on elderly & disabled in Table 3, the 
underestimation (in absolute terms) of the effect of LSS expenditure is 
evident: the OLS estimate is –0.140, while the 2SLS estimate is –0.418. 
From now on, the focus will be on the 2SLS results. In order to support 
the hypothesis that LSS expenditure crowds out other municipal 
expenditure, the LSS expenditure parameter should have a negative and 
significant effect on the expenditure studied. The result supports this 
hypothesis; it is indeed both negative and highly significant. The point 
estimate shows that for every 100 SEK increase in LSS expenditure, the 
expenditure on elderly & disabled care decreases by approximately 42 
SEK.  
 
In the model that estimates expenditures on elderly & disabled care, the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables for the share of elderly living in 
special residential homes, tax base, grants, and share of elderly, are as 
expected: all have a positive effect on the expenditure on elderly care (i.e. 
an increase in any of these variables increases the spending on elderly 
care). The (log) total population and the share of welfare recipients have a 
negative effect on the expenditure on elderly care (i.e. an increase in any of 
these variables decreases the spending on elderly care).  
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Table 3. Estimated results for Elderly & Disabled spending and 
 Education spending 
  Dependent Variables  
  Elderly & Disabled Care  Education 
Explanatory Variables  OLS  2SLS     OLS  2SLS 
           
LSS expenditure, SEK  -0.140***  -0.418***    0.071*  -0.355** 
  (0.038)  (0.139)    (0.039)  (0.149) 
Elderly with home care  -3.66  -3.07    --  -- 
  (10.23)  (10.04)       
Elderly living in special homes      88.28***  84.81***    --  -- 
  (15.04)  (15.30)       
Tax base t-1  0.074***  0.067***    0.058***  0.048*** 
  (0.009)  (0.010)    (0.008)  (0.009) 
Grants t-1  0.202***  0.185***    0.230***  0.204*** 
  (0.028)  (0.029)    (0.026)  (0.028) 
Debt t-1  0.002  0.003    -0.004  -0.004 
  (0.004)  (0.004)    (0.003)  (0.004) 
Ln Population t-1  -17460***  -18866***    3778**  1601 
  (1861)  (2093)    (1767)  (2058) 
Welfare t-1  -60.48***  -54.73***    -39.53**  -30.31* 
  (17.32)  (17.11)    (15.43)  (16.92) 
Share children (0-6) t-1  120.4**  154.9**    -263.4***  -210.1*** 
  (57.84)  (62.71)    (55.37)  (62.21) 
Share youth (7-15) t-1  41.1  62.9    203.7***  236.8*** 
  (43.62)  (45.28)    (46.37)  (50.74) 
Share elderly (75+) t-1  425.7***  480.4***    -169.8***  -86.2 
  (51.88)  (56.46)    (51.98)  (60.60) 
Unemployment  t-1  10.59  -6.540    89.80***  63.97** 
  (24.33)  (26.84)     (26.09)  (29.24) 
Year effects   yes  yes    yes  yes 
Fixed effects   yes  yes    yes  yes 
        To be continued 
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Table 3. continued           
  Elderly & Disabled Care  Education 
  OLS  2SLS     OLS  2SLS 
R-squared (within)  0.664  0.649    0.727  0.698 
Observations  2592  2592    2592  2592 
Number of municipalities  288  288    288  288 
Endogeneity test     3.96      9.63 
    Chi-sq(1) P-value    0.05      0.00 
Underidentification test     71.41      70.86 
    Chi-sq(3) P-value      0.00      0.00 
Hansen J statistic    3.58      3.15 
    Chi-sq(2) P-value     0.17        0.21 
 
Note: The standard errors in parenthesis are robust to heteroskedasticity. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Instruments: share of individuals receiving LSS services per 10000 inhabitants, share with the 
service "adults in residential homes", and share with the service "daily activity". Regressions 
are estimated with the XTIVREG2 command in STATA (Schaffer, M.E. 2007). 
 
Education spending 
The OLS estimate is also underestimated for LSS expenditure in the 
education spending equation. The OLS estimate is 0.07, while the 2SLS 
estimate is –0.36. Contrary to the result for the elderly & disabled where 
both the OLS and the 2SLS estimate were negative, the OLS estimate in 
the education equation is positive and significant at the ten percent level, 
while the 2SLS estimate is negative and significant at the five percent level. 
Not accounting for the simultaneity bias in the education spending 
equation would lead to an incorrect conclusion on how this sector is 
affected. Since LSS expenditure is endogenous here, we will focus on the 
2SLS estimates.  
 
In Table 3, we can see that expenditure on education is negatively and 
significantly affected by the LSS expenditure; once more supporting the 
crowding out hypothesis. The point estimate shows that the expenditure 28                                    Do Local Public Expenditures…
on education approximately decreases by 35 SEK for every 100 SEK 
increase in LSS expenditure. It is evident that education expenditure is 
greatly affected by increased expenditure on LSS services, despite its being 
in a different sector. Education is the second largest sector of the 
municipalities. Combined with being an area where municipalities’ have 
the power to decide on how to provide education (although governed by 
the Education Act) – this makes it an area that is easily affected when 
resources must be reallocated within the municipality. For the explanatory 
variables in the education expenditure model, we can see that tax base, 
grants, share of youth, and share of unemployment all have a positive 
effect on spending on education. The share of young children and the 
share of welfare recipients have a negative effect on education spending.  
 
Social assistance spending 
Let us now move on to the third spending category, social assistance. 
Since LSS expenditure can be treated as exogenous in this equation, the 
OLS estimates are not biased here as they were in the two previous 
categories. As can be seen in Table 4, the LSS expenditure parameter is 
negative, but non significant for the social assistance model. This indicates 
that LSS expenditure does not affect or crowd out spending on social 
assistance. So even though elderly & disabled care, social assistance, and 
services to functionally impaired together make up the social service 
sector, only elderly & disabled care is affected by the increasing 
expenditure on services to functionally impaired. This result may seem 
surprising. However, since social assistance is strictly governed by the 
Social Service Act, combined with being a small area within the 
municipality as well as within the social service sector, there is no room 
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the burden of financing the LSS services might fall on the service 
provision to elderly & disabled care rather than social assistance provision.  
 
Table 4. Estimated results for Social Assistance, Childcare & Preschool, and 
Culture & Leisure spending  
  Dependent Variables 
  Social Assistance  Childcare & Preschool  Culture & Leisure 
Explanatory Variables  OLS  2SLS     OLS  2SLS     OLS  2SLS 
                 
LSS expenditure, SEK  -0.004  0.020    0.008  0.029    0.006  0.069 
  (0.016)  (0.070)    (0.016)  (0.064)    (0.011)  (0.047) 
Tax base t-1  -0.003  -0.002    0.039***  0.039***    0.010***  0.012*** 
  (0.004)  (0.006)    (0.004)  (0.004)    (0.003)  (0.003) 
Grants t-1  0.017  0.018    0.111***  0.112***    0.039***  0.043*** 
  (0.013)  (0.013)    (0.013)  (0.017)    (0.008)  (0.009) 
Debt t-1  -0.002  -0.002    -0.003*  -0.003*    -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.002)  (0.002)    (0.002)  (0.002)    (0.001)  (0.001) 
Ln Population t-1  -3050***  -2928***    10233***  10342***  906.3  1228** 
  (866.8)  (925.9)    (933.6)  (1014)    (559.4)  (613.6) 
Welfare t-1  98.55***  98.04***    2.58  2.12  -16.43***  -17.79*** 
  (12.19)  (12.12)    (8.37)  (8.42)    (6.03)  (6.32) 
Share children (0-6) t-1  -68.1**  -71.0**    317.1***  314.5***    -47.2***  -55.1*** 
  (31.41)  (32.52)    (33.13)  (34.48)    (17.73)  (19.06) 
Share youth (7-15) t-1  -78.8***  -80.6***    23.4  21.7    3.1  -1.8 
  (24.76)  (25.30)    (23.15)  (23.87)    (15.31)  (15.56) 
Share elderly (75+) t-1  -7.68  -12.33    -2.95  -7.12    10.78  -1.59 
  (27.05)  (30.31)    (28.20)  (30.93)    (18.02)  (19.84) 
Unemployment  t-1  -4.29  -2.86    1.38  2.67    -6.13  -2.31 
   (11.59)  (12.19)     (11.85)  (12.31)     (12.13)  (12.57) 
Year effects   yes  yes    yes  yes    yes  yes 
Fixed effects   yes  yes    yes  yes    yes  yes 
              To be continued 
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Table 4. continued  
  Social Assistance  Childcare & Preschool  Culture & Leisure 
  OLS  2SLS     OLS  2SLS     OLS  2SLS 
R-squared (within)  0.320  0.319    0.731  0.731    0.145  0.130 
Observations  2592  2592    2592  2592    2592  2592 
No. of municipalities  288  288    288  288    288  288 
Endogeneity test     0.24      0.20      1.90 
    Chi-sq(1) P-value    0.63      0.66      0.17 
Underidentification test     70.89      70.86      70.86 
    Chi-sq(3) P-value         0.00      0.00      0.00 
Hansen J statistic    3.63      1.48      0.11 
    Chi-sq(2) P-value     0.16        0.48        0.95 
Note: The standard errors in parenthesis are robust to heteroscedasticity. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05,  * p<0.1 represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Instruments: share of individuals receiving LSS services per 10,000 inhabitants, share with the 
service "adults in residential homes", and share with the service "daily activity". Regressions 
are estimated with the XTIVREG2 command in STATA (Schaffer, M.E. 2007) 
 
 
Childcare & preschool spending 
For the fourth spending equation, childcare & preschool, the LSS 
expenditure can be treated as exogenous. Similarly to the social assistance 
category, there is no indication that childcare & preschool is affected by 
the increasing expenditure on LSS services. This result is realistic, since 
the spending on childcare & preschool only constitutes a smaller share of 
the total municipal budget. Therefore, it is not likely that the 
municipalities will make budget cuts in this category in order to finance 
LSS services.  
 
Culture & leisure spending 
Finally, for the last spending category, culture & leisure, it can be seen in 
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showing no evidence of crowding out. Since culture & leisure is the only 
category that is voluntary for the municipalities, it could be expected that 
increasing LSS expenditure would affect spending on culture & leisure in a 
negative way. However, the result indicates that the municipalities choose 
to reallocate resource from other categories, instead of decreasing 
spending on culture & leisure in order to finance the LSS service 
provision. One reason why the municipalities do not use resources from 
culture & leisure may be that this category is small and a decrease here 
would be more evident than a similar decrease in a larger size category. 
The results also point toward the fact that the municipalities indeed want 
to provide a certain level of culture & leisure and are therefore reluctant to 
decrease this spending; just to avoid their citizens migrating to other 
regions, so-called “Tiebout migration”. Although a municipality’s 
expenditure on culture & leisure may not be enough for anybody to 
migrate, it is a visible area and it is likely to act as a signal.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The focus of this study was to investigate the hypothesis that crowding 
out occurs within the local governments with respect to expenditures on 
one particular service area; services to functionally impaired individuals. It 
became the responsibility of the municipalities to provide this service in 
1994 via a reform, and the expenditures on this service have increased 
ever since. While the findings of this study do not support the existence of 
crowding out for three of the five expenditure categories studied (social 
assistance, childcare & preschool and culture & leisure), the findings 
strongly support crowding out of expenditures on elderly & disabled care 32                                    Do Local Public Expenditures…
and expenditures on education, both in a statistical and an economic 
sense.  
 
The results differ from those in the other studies on expenditure crowding 
out mentioned in the introduction; where none of those studies find 
support for the crowding out hypothesis. The difference between this 
study and previous studies might be the characteristics of the service area 
studied in this paper. At least three reasons come to mind. First, the area 
studied, i.e. services to the functionally impaired, is regulated via a strong 
entitlement law; the municipality must provide the care and services. 
Second, the expenditures on these services greatly exceeded the estimated 
costs (as predicted when the reform was implemented). For the 
municipality to finance the services, it must reallocate resources or crowd 
out other municipality expenditures. Third, the increasing LSS 
expenditures were not matched by any additional grant or funding for 
many years. This did not happen until 2004 when an intergovernmental 
LSS expenditure equalization grant system was implemented. However, 
the LSS expenditure equalization grant is not based upon the 
municipalities’ factual costs, instead it is based upon standardized costs 
calculated and set by the national government. Thus, the crowding out of 
other expenditures is likely to have continued also after 2004. Therefore, 
for municipalities to finance their spending on services to the functionally 
impaired, the result obtained here is very plausible, i.e. the spending on 
services to the functionally impaired crowds out other municipal 
expenditures. 
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Naturally, an extended time series would be useful for studying if the 
crowding out of expenditure persists over time, or if it flattens out. It 
would also be interesting to study if crowding out of these expenditures 
continues after the new intergovernmental expenditure equalization 
system (directed toward expenditures for LSS services) has been fully 
implemented (in 2009). Although the equalization grant/fee is not based 
on factual cost but rather on standardized calculated cost, it would be 
interesting to study if this is sufficient for the crowding out to vanish.  
 
This study shows the importance of considering the effect on other areas 
within the local government service provision when there are reforms, 
decentralization or national government intervention imposing new 
services on local governments targeted to a specific area. Moreover, the 
different effects on different expenditure categories must be taken into 
account when new services are imposed on local governments, making the 
findings in this study relevant in terms of policy implications and the 
design of new reforms.  
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Table A. Variable definitions and data sources.    
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Tax base, SEK 
 
Tax base per inhabitant calculated in 2007 
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1998-2004: the municipality's income from general 
inter-governmental grants per capita calculated in 
2007 monetary value; 2005-2006; the sum of 
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age 0-6, percent 
 







age 7-15, percent 
 
The percentage of the population between 7 and 






age 75+, percent 
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Note: The data sources are SCB = Statistic Sweden; WebOr and Kommundatabasen 
=  data from SCB but with tools to analyze municipalities and counties; NBHW = 
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